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Abstract
We examine preferences for sequences of delayed monetary gains. In the experimental literature,
two prominent models have been advanced as psychological descriptions of preferences for
sequences. In one model, the instantaneous utilities of the outcomes in a sequence are discounted
as a function of their delays, and assembled into a discounted utility of the sequence. In the other
model, the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is considered along with utility or
disutility from improvement in outcome utilities and utility or disutility from the spreading of
outcome utilities. Drawing on three threads of evidence concerning preferences for sequences of
monetary gains, we propose that the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is traded
off against the duration of utility accumulation. In our first experiment, aggregate choice behavior
provides qualitative support for the tradeoff model. In three subsequent experiments, one of which
incentivized, disaggregate choice behavior provides quantitative support for the tradeoff model in
Bayesian model contests. The third experiment addresses one thread of evidence that motivated
the tradeoff model: When, in the choice between two single dated outcomes, it is conveyed that
receiving less sooner means receiving nothing later, preference for receiving more later increases,
but when it is conveyed that receiving more later means receiving nothing sooner, preference is
left unchanged. Our results show that this asymmetric hidden-zero effect is indeed driven by those
supporting the tradeoff model. The tradeoff model also accommodates all remaining evidence on
preferences for sequences of monetary gains.
Keywords
Intertemporal choice; sequences; discounting; utility; tradeoff.
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Cumulative Weighing of Time in Intertemporal Tradeoffs
Intertemporal choices are those in which the outcomes of available options are distributed
over time, and tradeoffs must be made between what will be experienced and when. Examples of
choices with intertemporal features are those between professional careers, medical treatments,
and home mortgages. In these situations, the options of choice are well characterized as streams,
or sequences, of outcomes.
Most laboratory studies on the psychology of intertemporal choices restrict their scope to
choices between two single dated outcomes, as that between $100 in one year and $150 in two
years. Here, the outcomes are “distributed over time,” but only between the available options.
Some studies broaden the scope to choices between sequences of dated outcomes, as that between
a rising and a falling profile of monetary gains, e.g., {$100 in one year, $150 in two years} and
{$150 in one year, $100 in two years}. Here, the outcomes are also “distributed over time,” but
now within, as well as between, options. This comes closer to the real-life examples given above.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate preferences for sequences of monetary gains. In doing
so, we introduce a substantive innovation in the psychological modeling of individuals’ choices
between sequences, and present both qualitative and quantitative support for this new approach.
We consider three candidate models for describing preferences for sequences: Two
prominent models from the experimental literature, and a third model that we present as a
challenger. In what we call the discounted instantaneous utility model (Abdellaoui, Attema, &
Bleichrodt, 2010), instantaneous utilities are assigned to the dated outcomes in a sequence, each
utility is discounted as a function of the delay to the outcome, the discounted utilities of the
outcomes are assembled into the discounted utility of the sequence, and the sequence with the
highest discounted utility is chosen. In what we call the sequences model (Loewenstein & Prelec,
1993), the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is considered along with utility or
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disutility from improvement in outcome utilities and utility or disutility from the spreading of
outcome utilities, and the sequence with the highest utility is chosen. As a challenger, we propose
a modification of the tradeoff model (Read & Scholten, 2012; Scholten & Read, 2010), in which
the accumulated utility of the outcomes in a sequence is traded off against the duration of utility
accumulation, and the sequence favored by this tradeoff is chosen. Qualitative and quantitative
evidence from four experiments provides credence to the challenger.
Our model development is motivated by three threads of evidence concerning preferences
for sequences of unlabeled monetary gains, meaning money that is not attributed to a specific
origin, such as wage payments or rental income (e.g., Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). That
evidence shows deviations from the Net Present Value (NPV) model, the standard of economic
rationality found in textbooks on finance and economics (e.g., Brealey et al., 2012; Hey, 2003),
and due originally to Fisher (1930). In the NPV model, each outcome in a sequence is discounted
as a function of the delay to the outcome, at an interest rate determined by the opportunity cost of
money, and the discounted outcomes are assembled into the NPV of the sequence. Psychologists
often cite a variant of the NPV model, referred to as the exponential-discounting model, as the
normative standard. In their variant, r is any personal interest rate that may differ from the market
interest rate or opportunity cost of money (Read, Frederick, & Scholten, 2013; Scholten & Read,
2013). To illustrate the NPV model, consider the following choice pair, in which outcomes being
distributed over three consecutive years:
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Option
Delay to outcome Exponentially discounted outcome
1 2 3 (x1, 1) (x2, 2) (x3, 3)
Low NPV $1,000 000,1
1
1 2






 r
High NPV $500 $500 500
1
1






 r
500
1
1 3






 r
The term between brackets is the per-period discount factor, and, within it, r is the interest rate.
By any nonzero interest rate, i.e., either positive (r > 0) or, which is nonstandard in economics,
negative (1 < r < 0), the “high NPV option” has a higher Net Present Value than the “low NPV
option,” i.e., 500 / (1 + r) + 500 / (1 + r)3 > 1,000 / (1 + r)2, which solves for r2 > 0. In case of a
zero interest rate, the NPV of each sequence is simply the sum of its outcomes, which, in this
illustration, and in most research on preferences for sequences, is the same for both sequences.
The three threads of evidence are as follows.
Thread 1: Undecided preference between decreasing and constant sequences. In
incentivized studies, Manzini, Mariotti, and Mittone (2010) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997)
examined preferences between decreasing, constant, and increasing sequences. Sequences totaled
the same amount of money, e.g., {$32, $16} for a decreasing sequence, {$24, $24} for a constant
sequence, and {$16, $32} for an increasing sequence. Majorities preferred decreasing and
constant sequences to increasing ones (80% and 93%, respectively, in Manzini et al., 2010; 62%
and 82%, respectively, in Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997). This is consistent with the NPV model,
because a given amount of money sooner is always better than the same amount later. By the
same logic, however, decreasing sequences are better than constant ones, and, yet, no consensus
emerged, with only about half of the participants preferring decreasing sequences over constant
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ones (66% in Manzini et al., 2010, and 40% in Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997). Our experiments
confirm that preference between decreasing and constant sequences is basically undecided (i.e.,
close to chance level).
Thread 2: The asymmetric hidden-zero effect. The hidden-zero effect (Magen, Dweck, &
Gross, 2008) is that people are less patient when choosing between single dated outcomes, e.g.,
“$100 today” (SS, for Smaller-Sooner) and “$150 in one year” (LL, for Larger-Later), than when
choosing between the outcome sequences “$100 today and $0 in one year” (SS0) and “$0 today
and $150 in one year” (LL0). That is, choosing LL rather than SS is less likely than choosing LL0
rather than SS0. This is incompatible with the NPV model, because zero outcomes have zero
value, and should therefore not affect preference. Subsequent research (Read, Olivola, & Hardisty,
in press; Wu & He, 2012) has shown, however, that the zeroes are not equal: Adding a later zero
(changing SS into SS0) increases patience, but adding a sooner zero (changing LL into LL0) has no
effect. We will show that this asymmetric hidden-zero effect is driven by those individuals whose
preferences are best described by the tradeoff model.
Thread 3: Preference for faster accumulation. The third thread of evidence originally
came from informal observations, which we then confirmed experimentally. It concerns the
preference between the low and high NPV options discussed earlier. Given any time preference,
the NPV model predicts a preference for the high NPV option over the low NPV option. We
conducted informal surveys of colleagues and students, and, without any exception, large
majorities preferred the low NPV option, arguing that, with the low NPV option, they would
receive the full amount sooner. That is, they would receive the full $1,000 by the second period,
whereas, with the high NPV option, they would have to wait until the third period to get that full
amount. Confirming these informal observations, 71% chose the low NPV option in an MTurk
survey of 429 American residents, and 79% did so in a survey of 321 British residents.1 We will
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show that, by holding on to the logic of our colleagues and students, which is that the low NPV
option accumulates faster to $1,000 than the high NPV option, we arrive at a model of
intertemporal choice that offers the best account of preferences for monetary sequences.
Models of Preferences for Sequences
Below, we describe the three candidate models of preferences for sequences, and discuss
how each deals with the three threads of evidence discussed in the introduction. It turns out that
the discounted instantaneous utility model and the sequences model fail to offer a coherent
account of the evidence, whereas the tradeoff model does, and in a parsimonious way. This will
set the stage for four experiments, in which we examine whether the tradeoff model outperforms
the other candidate models in accounting for fresh evidence.
The discounted instantaneous utility model
We earlier described the NPV model, in which outcomes are discounted at a constant rate
as a function of their delays. An alternative to the NPV model is the discounted instantaneous
utility model, in which utilities are assigned to the outcomes (by means of a utility function that
may not be linear), and the utilities are discounted at a personal rate (which may deviate from the
rate deriving from the economically appropriate interest rate). Formally, the discounted utility of a
sequence is given as:



n
i
i
t
nn xutxtxU i
1
11 )(),...;;,(  , (1)
where xi is the ith outcome in the sequence, ti is its delay, n is the number of outcomes in the
sequence, and u is an instantaneous utility function satisfying u(0) = 0 (Abdellaoui et al., 2010,
Wakker, 2010). Even though u might be any monotonically increasing function, it is commonly
assumed to be concave over gains, meaning that it exhibits diminishing sensitivity (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). Diminishing sensitivity is that the marginal impact
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of an outcome decreases with its absolute magnitude; e.g., adding $1 to $100 has psychologically
less impact than adding $1 to $10.
Table 1 summarizes how the discounted instantaneous utility model (and the models yet to
be discussed) deals with the three threads of evidence. We begin with Thread 1, or the undecided
preference between decreasing and constant sequences. Consider the decreasing sequence {$400,
$200} and the constant sequence {$300, $300}. By constant discounting of outcomes, or
computation of Net Present Value, we have 400 +  2200 > 300 +  2300, or 100 > 100, so that
the decreasing sequence would be preferred to the constant one. The discounted instantaneous
utility model, however, posits discounting of outcome utilities. Concave utility countervails
discounting, in that u(400) + u(200) < 2u(300), which favors the constant sequence. When
concave utility outweighs discounting, we have u(400) +  2u(200) < u(300) +  2u(300), or
u(400) – u(300) <  [u(300) – u(200)], so that the constant sequence would be preferred to the
decreasing one. With discounting and concave utility working in opposite directions, there may be
no consensus on the preference between decreasing and constant sequences, which is Thread 1.
The discounted instantaneous utility model further predicts that the increasing sequence {$200,
$400} will lose from the decreasing sequence {$400, $200}, by discounting, and from the
constant sequence {$300, $300}, by both discounting and concave utility, consistent with the
results from Manzini et al. (2010) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997).
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Importantly, any preference for a constant sequence over a decreasing one is a violation of
dominance, a cornerstone in the rational choice paradigm (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), which, in
the domain of intertemporal choice, affirms that, when the cumulative outcome of sequence X in
the successive time periods is never worse than that of sequences Y, and better in at least one time
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period, then X dominates Y, and should be chosen (Scholten & Read, 2014). This definition of
dominance assumes that more money is better than less (monotonicity), and that money is better
sooner than later (positive time preference; Fisher, 1930). Thus, holding the total amount earned
constant, a decreasing sequence dominates a constant one, and a constant sequence dominates an
increasing one. By dominance, people should indeed prefer decreasing and constant sequences to
increasing ones, as observed, but they should also prefer decreasing sequences to constant ones,
while no consensus emerged. The discounted instantaneous utility model offers an explanation for
this, by suggesting that concave utility countervails discounting, and is therefore a nonnormative
model.
The discounted instantaneous utility model can further accommodate the preference for
faster accumulation (Thread 3) when assuming that discounting is outweighed by convex utility,
or augmenting sensitivity, in which case we have u(500) +  3u(500) <  2u(1,000), or  1u(500)
+  u(500) < u(1,000). Concave utility over gains is a nonstandard assumption, and, in any case,
the discounted instantaneous utility model needs concave utility to accommodate the undecided
preference between decreasing and constant sequences (Thread 1). It thus cannot offer a coherent
account of the prior evidence.
The discounted instantaneous utility model cannot account for the (asymmetric) hidden-
zero effect (Thread 2) either, because zero outcomes have zero utility, and should therefore not
affect preference.
The sequences model
Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) developed the sequences model. “The guiding idea behind
the model,” according to the authors, “is that evaluation of sequences reflects the interaction
between two motives: a basic preference for improvement tempered by a desire to spread the
better outcomes more or less uniformly over the entire interval” (p. 92). In proposing a preference
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for improvement, they were partly motivated by Loewenstein and Sicherman’s (1991) finding that
people preferred increasing over decreasing sequences of monetary gains. As mentioned earlier,
Manzini et al. (2010) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997) found a strong preference for decreasing
over increasing sequences. While Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) used large amounts of
money, labeled the money, i.e., specified its origin (wage payments or rental income), and
presented the sequences using column charts to museum visitors, whereas Manzini et al. (2010)
and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997) used small amounts of money, did not label the money, and
presented sequences using delay-by-payoff matrices to college students. It is not entirely clear
which methodological differences are responsible for the opposite results, but preference for
increasing sequences is more pronounced for larger amounts of money (Duffy & Smith, 2013),
more pronounced for income from labor than for income from rent (Loewenstein & Sicherman,
1991) and income from lotteries (Duffy & Smith, 2013; Duffy, Smith, & Woods, 2015), perhaps
because people expect wages to increase over time (Chapman, 1996), and more pronounced
among naïve people than among (financially) sophisticated people (Guyse, Keller, & Eppel, 2002;
Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Matsumoto, Peecher, & Rich, 2000). In any case, the sequences
model is very general, in that it allows individuals to either like or dislike improvement, and either
like or dislike spreading, so we will give it maximum latitude.
As applied to sequences of future outcomes distributed over contiguous time periods (e.g.,
three years, as in the choice between the high and low NPV options), the sequences model has
three components: One is the sum of instantaneous utilities, and the others are the ““gestalt”
properties of sequences” (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993, p. 94): Improvement and spreading.
The sequences model draws on the concept of cumulative instantaneous utilities. Imagine
that, in each period, some instantaneous utility is received, and a running total of that utility is
kept. This is the cumulative instantaneous utility. This “real” running total is compared with an
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“imaginary” running total from a constant utility stream across the periods. More precisely, in
each period, the utility that has accumulated until that period is compared with the utility that
would have accumulated until that period had the same sum of utility been distributed uniformly
over time:



i
j
j
n
j
ji xuxun
id
11
)()( . (2a)
where the second term on the right is the utility that has accumulated until each period i, and the
first term on the right is the utility that would have accumulated until that period had the same
sum of utility been distributed uniformly over time. To see how this works, assume linear utility,
i.e., u(x) = x, and consider the sequence S = {$100, $200, $300}, the cumulative outcomes of
which are CS = {$100, $300, $600}. Had the outcomes been distributed evenly over time, we
would have had the (flat) sequence F = {$200, $200, $200}, the cumulative outcomes of which
are CF = {$200, $400, $600}. We see that CF “runs ahead” of CS by $200 – $100 = $100 in period
1, and by $400 – $300 = $100 in period 2. The improvement score of the sequence S is the sum of
these differences, i.e.,  di, or $100 + $100 = $200, which is a positive number, and therefore an
indication of improvement rather than decline (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). It is no coincidence
that the improvement score equals the difference between the outcome afforded by S in period 3
and the outcome afforded in period 1, i.e., $300 – $100 = $200, because, for any three-outcome
sequence {x1, x2, x3}, the improvement score is u(x3) – u(x1), which is the difference between the
utility of the last outcome and the utility of the first outcome in the sequence. For an increasing
sequence, the improvement score is positive; for a constant sequence, it is zero; and, for a
decreasing sequence, it is negative. To capture an individual’s attitude toward improvement, the
improvement score is weighted by , where  > 0 is a desire for improvement,  = 0 is neutrality
toward improvement, and  < 0 is distaste for improvement.2
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The spreading score of a sequence is the sum of the absolute differences, i.e.,  |di|, which
indicates how much the sequence deviates from a uniform distribution. For the sequence S, all
differences are positive, so that its spreading score equals the improvement score. More generally,
for a three-outcome sequence {x1, x2, x3}, the spreading score is ⅓(|u(x3) + u(x2) – 2u(x1)| + |2u(x3)
– u(x2) – u(x1)|), which contrasts the utilities in periods 3 and 2 with the utility in period 1, and
contrasts the utility in period 3 with the utilities in periods 2 and 1. For a constant sequence, the
spreading score is zero; for an increasing or a decreasing sequence, it is positive. To capture an
individual’s attitude toward spreading, the spreading score is weighted by , where  > 0 is a
desire for spreading (meaning that the utility of the sequence decreases more with a larger
deviation from a uniform distribution),  = 0 is neutrality toward spreading, and  < 0 is distaste
for spreading (meaning that the utility of the sequence increases more with a larger deviation from
a uniform distribution).3 Formally, the utility of a sequence is given as:


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Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) applied the model in Equations (2a) and (2b) to decisions
about consumption experiences, e.g., weekends differing in their pleasantness, and observed a
preference for improvement tempered by a desire for spreading. As mentioned, however, the
model is very general, and allows for any attitude toward improvement and spreading. Moreover,
its flexibility can be enhanced even further by alternative treatments of concealed zero outcomes.
In one variant of the sequences model, which we call the no-zero sequences model,
concealed zeroes are not inferred. The no-zero sequences model can accommodate the asymmetric
hidden-zero effect (Thread 2) if it invokes a desire for improvement and a desire for spreading,
consistent with Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993) findings. Either zero creates a sequence that
deviates from a uniform distribution, which, under a desire for spreading, is evaluated negatively.
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The later zero (changing SS into SS0) creates a decreasing sequence, which, under a desire for
improvement, is evaluated negatively as well. With the desire for improvement reinforcing the
desire for spreading, the later zero will increase preference for LL. In contrast, the sooner zero
(changing LL into LL0) creates an increasing sequence, which, under a desire for improvement, is
evaluated positively. With the desire for improvement countervailing the desire for spreading, the
sooner zero may not affect preference between SS and LL0, and it will not do so if the desire for
improvement precisely offsets the desire for spreading. Thus, to accommodate the asymmetric
hidden-zero effect, the no-zero sequences model can preserve a desire for improvement and a
desire for spreading. However, to accommodate preference for decreasing over increasing
sequences, which accompanies the undecided preference between decreasing and constant
sequences (Thread 1) and preference for constant over increasing sequences, the non-zero
sequences model needs distaste for improvement. It therefore fails to offer a coherent account of
the prior evidence.
In the other variant of the sequences model, which we call the zero sequences model,
concealed zeroes are inferred. For this variant, the asymmetric hidden-zero effect (Thread 2) is
insurmountable. When the later zero is revealed by the experimenter (changing SS into SS0), the
sooner zero is inferred by the decision maker (changing LL into LL0), and, when the sooner zero is
revealed by the experimenter (changing LL into LL0), the later zero is inferred by the decision
maker (changing SS into SS0). Because either zero changes the choice into one between SS0 and
LL0, it cannot be that one zero has an effect, whereas the other has not. Thus, the zero sequences
model also fails to accommodate the prior evidence. Table 1 provides additional details on how
the sequences model can enforce its flexibility to address the isolated pieces of prior evidence.
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The tradeoff model
Whereas, in the sequences model, the accumulated utility of the outcomes is combined
with the utility deriving from a desire or distaste for improvement and the utility deriving from a
desire or distaste for spreading, we propose an instantiation of intertemporal the tradeoff model in
which the accumulated utility is traded off against the duration of utility accumulation. Generally,
the duration of a sequence is some average of the constituent delays:



n
j
jjtat
1
ˆ , where 


n
j
ja
1
1 .
In the instantiation of the intertemporal tradeoff model proposed by Read and Scholten (2012),
duration lies between two limits. One is the unweighted average of constituent delays, aj = 1 / n,
and the other is the weighted average of constituent delays, with each delay being weighted by the
relative magnitude of the outcome received following that delay:

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Whatever the computation, the duration of a sequence lies between the delay to the first outcome
(t1) and the delay to the last outcome (tn), because money is received after t1, meaning that the
duration will be longer than t1, and money is received before tn, meaning that the duration will be
shorter than tn: The duration thus lies “somewhere in between.” In light of Thread 3 (preference
for faster accumulation), we propose to preserve the concept of duration, but, in its computation,
to weigh individual delays by cumulative outcome utilities, meaning that aj is given as:
 
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When aj is specified in this way, tˆ becomes the duration of utility accumulation, obtained through
a cumulative weighing of time, with each tj being weighted by the utility accumulating until period
j, normalized by the utility accumulating until all time periods:

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Consider the high NPV option {$500 in one year, $500 in three years}, with which the utility
accumulating to period 1 is u(500), the utility accumulating until period 3 is u(500) + u(500), and
the utility accumulating until both time periods is u(500) + (u(500) + u(500)). Thus, the duration
of the high NPV option is:
33.23
))500()500(()500(
)500()500(1
))500()500(()500(
)500(ˆ 





uuu
uu
uuu
utH .
In contrast, the low NPV option ($1,000 in two years) is a single dated outcome, which has no
duration, and its delay is tL = 2. Because the duration of the high NPV option is longer than the
delay of the low NPV option, i.e., 33.2ˆ Ht > 2 = tL, the cumulative weighing of time contributes
to a preference for the low NPV option.
To complete the analysis, we must specify the tradeoff model in its full form. The tradeoff
model is an attribute-based model, in that outcome and time advantages of the options are traded
off against one another, and the option favored by the tradeoff is chosen. In contrast, the previous
models are alternative-based models, in that each option receives a utility, independently of the
other option, and the option with the highest utility is chosen. According to the tradeoff model, the
decision maker will be indifferent between the high NPV option (H) and the low NPV option (L)
when:
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where, analogous to  < 1 in discounting models,  > 0 captures impatience, with higher values
benefiting the sequence with the shortest duration, and w is a (concave) time-weighing function
(thus exhibiting diminishing sensitivity).5 Furthermore, the difference between the accumulated
utilities is an advantage of H when positive and an advantage of L when negative, whereas the
difference between weighted durations is an advantage of L when positive and an advantage of H
when negative. In the above choice between the high NPV option and the low NPV option, the
low NPV option is a single dated outcome, so that LL tt ˆ , and this delay is shorter than the
duration of the high NPV option, i.e., HL tt ˆ , which contributes to preference for the low NPV
option. By diminishing sensitivity to outcomes (concavity of the utility function u), however, the
accumulated utility of the high NPV option will be higher than the utility of the low NPV option,
i.e., u(500) + u(500) > u(1,000), contributing to a preference for the high NPV option. Preference
for the low NPV option (Thread 3) occurs when concave utility is outweighed by the cumulative
weighing of time.
The tradeoff model in Equations (3a) and (3b) also accounts for the asymmetric hidden-
zero effect (Thread 2). The smaller-sooner outcome (SS) is “$100 today.” This option has no
duration, and its delay is tSS = 0. Revealing the later zero outcome, i.e., “$100 today and $0 in one
year” (SS0), creates a sequence, which has duration. Specifically, the duration of SS0 is:
2
11
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
uuu
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uuu
utSS .
Because
0SˆS
t = ½ > 0 = tSS, revealing the later zero increases preference for LL. Conversely, the
larger-later outcome (LL) is “$150 in one year,” the delay of which is tLL. Revealing the sooner
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zero outcome, i.e., “$0 today and $150 in one year” (LL0), creates a sequence, the duration of
which is:
11
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utLL .
Because
0LˆL
t = 1 = tLL, revealing the sooner zero does not affect preference between SS and LL.
Therefore, a cumulative weighing of time naturally produces the asymmetric hidden-zero effect.
Finally, the tradeoff model in Equations (3a) and (3b) agrees with the one proposed by
Read and Scholten (2012) that duration is longer for increasing than for constant sequences, and
longer for constant than for decreasing sequences. Increasing sequences lose from decreasing
sequences because of their longer duration, and lose from constant sequences not only because of
their longer duration, but also because of concave utility. The undecided preference between
decreasing and constant sequences (Thread 1) occurs because duration (favoring the decreasing
sequence) is countervailed by concave utility (favoring the constant sequence). Overall, and as
summarized in Table 1, a tradeoff model in which the accumulated utility of a sequence is traded
off against the duration of utility accumulation offers a coherent and parsimonious account of all
prior evidence.
As mentioned in Footnote 5, Equation (3b) may be rearranged into an (arithmetically)
“discounted utility” model, by which uH   Htˆ = uL   Ltˆ . The current specification of the
tradeoff model thus seems to blur the distinction between attribute-based choice and alternative-
based choice. Our application of the tradeoff model would seem to do so as well, because choice
will be assumed to follow a stochastic difference rule, so that the probability of choosing the high
NPV option is F[(uH  uL)  ( Htˆ  Ltˆ )], which is equivalent to F[(uH   Htˆ )  (uL   Ltˆ )].
However, if the tradeoff model were an alternative-based choice model, a sequence of positive
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outcomes might receive a negative “discounted utility,” which is formally unacceptable and
psychologically implausible. This constitutes a compelling argument for maintaining that the
tradeoff model is an attribute-based choice model.
Candidate models
We identified three candidate models for describing preferences for sequences: The
Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM), in Equation (1), the Sequences Model (SM), in
Equations (2a) and (2b), as previously applied by Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) and Guyse et al.
(2002), and the Tradeoff Model (TM), in Equations (3a) and (3b). Although Loewenstein and
Prelec (1993) applied Equations (2a) and (2b) in their empirical test of SM, they also showed how
discounting of individual outcome utilities could be incorporated into their model. As evident
from their simulations (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993, Figure 4), discounting interacts with the
“gestalt” properties of sequence when a sequence starts in (or close to) the present (e.g., 0, 1, and
2) or when time periods are noncontiguous (e.g., 1, 2, and 10). Similar to Loewenstein and Prelec
(1993), who used contiguous one-week intervals starting in one week, we use contiguous one-year
intervals starting in one year (i.e., 1, 2, and 3). And, as Loewenstein and Prelec (1993) did, we
compare the performance of SM with that of DIUM. The novelty is that we introduce TM, with its
cumulative weighing of time, as a candidate model, and that we apply the candidate models to
sequences of unlabeled monetary gains rather than consumption experiences.
In Experiment 1, we compare the qualitative predictions of the candidate models in an
aggregate analysis, and, in Experiments 2 to 4, we compare their quantitative predictions in a
Bayesian model contest in disaggregate analyses. We find that TM best describes both the
“representative agent” and the majority of agents individually. In Experiment 3, we validate the
Bayesian model contest against the asymmetric hidden-zero effect, which we show to be indeed
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driven by those participants best described by TM. We conclude with an assessment of how TM
deals with remaining evidence on preferences for sequences of unlabeled monetary gains.
Experiment 1:
Concealed Zeroes Revealed
In Experiment 1, we examine, within the “hidden-zero paradigm,” how the preference
between low and high NPV sequences is affected when the zero outcomes are revealed. We
introduce two changes to elicitation of preference between the low and high NPV options. First,
we use multiples of £100 below the £1,000 mark. Indeed, a partial explanation of the preference
for the low NPV option might be that the number “1,000” acquires special significance among
numbers that are merely multiples of “100.” We therefore use tasks in which the numbers are
“300” and “600,” or “400” and “800.” Second, we present the choice pairs in delay-by-payoff
matrices, with the options designated as “plans,” as shown in Figure 1 (see also Manzini et al.,
2010; Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997). In our informal inquiries and initial surveys, the choice pairs
were presented as follows:
Which option do you prefer?
o Receive $500 in one year and receive $500 in three years.
o Receive $1,000 in two years.
A partial explanation of the preference for the low NPV option might be that it “ended earlier” in
a reading from left to right. Delay-by-payoff matrices resolve this problem, and ensure that, when
zero outcomes are revealed, nothing changes in the presentation format, except for the appearance
of the zeroes.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
So the question is how preference changes when, for instance, the choice between £800 in
two years and {£400 in one year, £400 in three years} is changed into a choice between {£0 in one
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year, £800 in two years, £0 in three years} and {£400 in one year, £0 in two years, £400 in three
years}. According to the Tradeoff Model (TM), concealed zeroes are not inferred. With zero
outcomes concealed, TM produces a preference for the low NPV option (£800 in two years) when
duration outweighs concave utility. When, however, the low NPV option is changed into {£0 in
one year, £800 in two years, £0 in three years}, year one has no weight, because zero utility
accumulates until year one, year two is weighted by the accumulated utility u(0) + u(800) =
u(800), and so is year three, i.e., u(0) + u(800) + u(0) = u(800). Thus, compared with a situation
in which zeroes are concealed, year three has weight, which increases the duration of the low
NPV option. In addition, when the high NPV option is changed into {£400 in one year, £0 in two
years, £400 in three years}, year one is weighted by the accumulated utility u(400), year two as
well, i.e., u(400) + u(0) = u(400), and year three is weighted by the accumulated utility u(400) +
u(0) + u(400) = 2u(400). Thus, compared with a situation in which zeroes are concealed, year two
has weight, which decreases the duration of the high NPV option. In sum, revealing zeroes
increases the duration of the low NPV option, and decreases the duration of the high NPV option,
and should thus increase preference for the high NPV option.
The Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM) can produce a preference for the low
NPV option if concave utility, or diminishing sensitivity, is replaced by convex utility, which
would have to outweigh discounting. However, because zero outcomes have zero utility, and
therefore do not affect the discounted utilities of the options, DIUM predicts that preference for
the low NPV option should be unaffected by revealing zero outcomes.
The Sequences Model (SM) shares its prediction with either TM or DIUM, depending on
the specific assumptions invoked. To reach the TM prediction, SM may assume that concealed
zeroes are not inferred (the No-Zero Sequences Model, or SMNZ). It can produce a preference for
the low NPV option if concave utility is replaced by convex utility (see Table 1). When the zeroes
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are revealed, both options become sequences that deviate from a uniform distribution, but the high
NPV option deviates less from a uniform distribution than the low NPV option. Thus, if SMNZ
assumes a desire for spreading, it predicts that revealing zeroes increases preference for the high
NPV option, as TM does on other grounds.
To reach the DIUM prediction, SM may assume that concealed zeroes are inferred (the
Zero Sequences Model, or SMZ). Both options are sequences that deviate from a uniform
distribution, but the high NPV option deviates less from a uniform distribution than the low NPV
option. SMZ can then produce a preference for the low NPV option if convex utility reinforces
distaste for spreading or outweighs a desire for spreading, or if distaste for spreading outweighs
concave utility (see Table 1). However, because zero outcomes, revealed or concealed, are
considered anyway, SMZ predicts that preference for the low NPV option should be unaffected by
revealing zero outcomes, as DIUM does on other grounds.
It thus appears that SM can have it both ways. However, this is more apparent than real,
because both SMNZ and SMZ fail to accommodate the prior evidence, as discussed earlier. On
the one hand, SMNZ cannot reconcile the asymmetric hidden-zero effect with the preference for
decreasing over increasing sequences; on the other hand, SMZ cannot produce the asymmetric
hidden-zero effect whatsoever. Because there is no parameterization of SM that accommodates
prior evidence, SM fails to produce an a priori prediction for the present experiment.
Method
Participants
Participants were 703 British residents, recruited through Maximiles (now rebranded to
Bilendi), an Internet service that awards its members points, tradeable for goods and services, for
completing surveys. The sample was 57% female, with an average age of 39. The great majority
(86%) were employed (61% full time), and a majority (59%) had an academic degree (41%
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bachelors, 15% masters, 3% PhD). For 50% of the participants, the total combined income of all
members of the family was between £20,000 and £59,999, for 15% it was £60,000 or more, and
for 24% it was less than £20,000, with 11% preferring not to report their income.
The samples of all our experiments, including this one, were recruited in “one go,” and no
participants were ever removed from the samples (except for three participants in Experiment 4,
who were dropped from further analysis due to a programming error). We recruited rather large
samples, because, in the subsequent modeling experiments, participants would disperse across
candidate models as “their” model, and, in the present experiment, they disperse across two
between-participants conditions. The largest sample is collected in Experiment 3, which is a
modeling experiment with three between-participants conditions.
Stimuli
There were four choice pairs, as displayed in Table 2. Two pairs were compromised of a
“low NPV option” and a “high NPV option” as discussed throughout the theoretical introduction,
or a single dated outcome in period 2, and a sequence of two equal outcomes in periods 1 and 3
affording the same total amount. In two other pairs, the sequence was changed by increasing the
outcome in period 1 and correspondingly decreasing the outcome in period 3. According to each
candidate model, this should increase the preference for the sequence (and so it did).
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the zero condition or the no-zero condition.
As mentioned earlier, choice pairs were presented in delay-by-payoff matrices, with the options
designated as “plans.” The participant selected either the Plan A button or the Plan B button at the
bottom of the screen, and could change his or her selection before confirming it by clicking on the
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arrow in the bottom-left corner of the screen. The order of the choice pairs, and the left-right order
of the options in each choice pair, was randomized across participants.
Results
The results are reported in Table 2. Majorities preferred the low NPV option to the high
NPV option in the no-zero condition, and, in the zero condition, preference for the high NPV
option increased, such that, now, majorities preferred that option. As suspected, the majorities
preferring the low NPV option to the high NPV option in the no-zero condition were smaller than
in our informal inquiries and initial surveys.
Discussion
The results favored the Tradeoff Model (TM) over the Discounted Instantaneous Utility
Model (DIUM), because TM correctly predicted an increased preference for the high NPV option
in the zero condition, whereas DIUM predicted that preference between the high and low NPV
options would not change. The evidence also favors TM over the Sequences Model (SM), because
TM provides an a priori prediction of the observed change in preference, whereas SM does not; a
posteriori, the results would favor SMNZ over SMZ.
Experiment 2:
No Size Fits All
The purpose of Experiment 2 is to conduct a first Bayesian contest between our candidate
models. In the previous experiment, we tested the models in aggregate choice behavior, basically
assuming that the average participants is representative of all participants; in this experiment, we
recognize that the “representative agent” may not exist, or that the average participant is perhaps
representative of many, but not all.
The models differ in their policy on zero outcomes. The Discounted Instantaneous Utility
Model (DIUM) holds that it does not matter whether revealed or concealed zeroes are ignored or
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considered, because zero outcomes have zero utility, and therefore do not affect discounted utility.
The Tradeoff Model (TM) holds that it does matter how zeroes are treated, and proposes that
concealed zeroes are ignored, whereas revealed zeroes are considered. Finally, the Sequences
Model (SM) also holds that it matters how zeroes are treated, but is silent on whether concealed
zeroes are, as in the No-Zero Sequences Model (SMNZ), ignored or, as in the Zero Sequences
Model (SMZ), considered. We therefore include both variants of SM as candidate models in our
Bayesian contest.
Method
Participants
Participants were 520 British residents, recruited through Maximiles. The sample was 61%
female, with an average age of 37. The great majority (83%) were employed (61% full time), and
a large majority (94%) had an academic degree (63% bachelors, 27% masters, 5% PhD). For 52%
of the participants, the total combined income of all members of the family was between £20,000
and £59,999, for 20% it was £60,000 or more, and for 16% it was less than £20,000, with 13%
preferring not to report their income.
Stimuli
Stimuli were selected from a space spanned by two options and three time periods, making
for six slots. At each stimulus construction trial, each slot was filled with an amount randomly
selected from among £800, £600, £400, and £200, along with a “blank” (zero) outcome, so that
the outcomes were equally spaced and below the £1,000 mark. Prior criteria were that the options
should not be identical, that at least one option should be a sequence, that, across options, at least
one nonzero outcome occurred in each time period, that, across options and time periods, at least
one zero outcome occurred, that, in no time period, the options had identical outcomes (avoiding
common consequences), and that the options afforded the same total amount.
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Selection of choice tasks took place in two runs, one searching for nondominance relations
(ND), the other searching for dominance relations (D), between options affording the same total
amount. Choice tasks in which Net Present Value could, depending on the discount rate, yield
either preference order of the options were discarded. Choice tasks in which Net Present Value
yielded the same preference order of the options as duration (computed with outcomes, rather than
unknown outcome utilities) were also discarded. Run ND identified 28 choice tasks, while run D
identified 1 choice task. One choice task identified by run ND, and the choice task identified by
run D, included options with equal duration.
From the 29 choice tasks identified, seven with nondominance relations were dropped to
reduce repetitiveness in the stimulus set, and thus fatigue and boredom on the part of the
participants. These were replaced by four tasks with dominance relations: Two included a
decreasing sequence and an increasing sequence affording the same total amount (one with a
linear progression, the other with a nonlinear progression); the remaining two included a constant
sequence and either a linearly decreasing sequence or a linearly increasing sequence affording the
same total amount. These four tasks served to relate our results back to those from Manzini et al.
(2010) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997). Table 3 shows the 26 choice tasks used in Experiment 2,
with the first five exhibiting dominance relations.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Procedure
Participants were informed they would make 26 choices, and that, for each choice, they
should assume they were entitled to receive money, which they could receive according to two
plans. They were told that all plans spanned a period of three consecutive years, and that they
could choose the plan they liked best. Participants started with a rehearsal choice between two
options exhibiting a transparent dominance relation, one yielding £200 in one year, £300 in two
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years, and £400 in three years, and the other yielding £100 less in each consecutive year. After
making their choice, we told participants they probably noticed that the choice was very easy: One
option yielded more money in each year, so surely they wanted that. We added, however, that the
remaining choices would not be so easy, because the options would yield the same total amount.
Model estimation and evaluation
We investigated the support for each model from each individual participant using a
Bayesian analysis. A Bayesian analysis allows the user to make clear and coherent statements
about the direction and magnitude of the evidence in favor of each model for each individual
participant. It automatically adjusts for each model’s complexity using the priors assigned to the
parameters. The key measure of a Bayesian analysis is the result of the prior probability of the
parameters multiplied by the likelihood of the data given those parameters, and the logic of this
measure can be conveyed with a stock-market metaphor. Each model can be thought of as a stock
portfolio, which starts with the same amount of money (the prior) that can be split amongst its
companies (the parameter settings). The monetary gain from a company is the product of how
much money is invested in that company and its performance, which is its share price at sale
divided by the share price at purchase (the likelihood of the data given that parameter setting). The
overall monetary gain from the portfolio is the sum of the results from each company in the
portfolio. The narrower the range of companies in a portfolio, the more that can be invested in
each company, and the larger the amount that will be gained if those companies do well. It thus
becomes intuitive why, for a given model, a narrower range of prior parameter settings is better
than a wider range if that those parameters perform equally well.
We present the evidence in the form of Bayes Factors (Kass & Raftery, 1995), which are
statements of the relative likelihood of obtaining the data, D, from a pair of models, M1 and M2,
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where p(D|M) is the probability of the data given model M. Using Bayes Factors as a measure of
the evidence easily allows readers to integrate their personal opinions about the plausibility of
each model with that evidence. What a reader should believe about each model after observing the
data is just their relative prior beliefs in two models p(M1) / p(M2) multiplied by the Bayes Factor,
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and, when we report the posterior probabilities of models, we assume that the priors over models
are always equal.
Bayes Factors are calculated by essentially finding the likelihood of the data for every
possible setting of each model’s parameters, with each set of parameters weighted by its prior
belief in that set of parameters, which is known as the marginal likelihood
  dMpMDpMDp )|(),|()|( ,
where θ is a set of parameters for model M. We did not discover an analytic solution to this
equation, but on visual inspection we noticed that the posterior distributions were not particularly
narrow compared to the prior distributions for individual participants. This potentially allows us to
sidestep complex simulation methods such as Markov chain Monte Carlo and instead use a simple
Monte Carlo approximation for the marginal likelihood:
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where the j are samples from the prior over parameters p( | M). When the posterior is not too
narrow compared to the prior distribution, samples drawn from the prior will often fall in regions
of high posterior probability, yielding a stable estimate of the marginal likelihood. We assessed
Cumulative Weighing of Time in Intertemporal Tradeoffs 28
the stability of our marginal likelihoods by running our main analysis twice. The same model was
found to have the highest marginal likelihood for 99.2% of the participants, and, as an absolute
measure of stability, the average deviation in model posterior probability between the two runs,
assuming equal priors for all models, was 0.001 across all participants and models.
Unpacking the Bayesian analysis even further, the likelihood of the data was simply the
likelihood of the model producing the same set of binary choices as a participant, which can be
expressed as:
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where xi acquires the value of 1 if the high NPV option is chosen from choice pair i, and the value
of 0 otherwise, iPˆ is the predicted probability of choosing the high NPV option from choice pair i
using model M, and m is the number of choice pairs. The predicted probability of choosing the
high NPV option is given by the logistic distribution function:
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where  regulates the degree to which choice probabilities are determined by the model, with a
value of zero indicating that choice is totally random (only “noise”). For the choice pairs in which
one option dominates the other (e.g., the choice between a decreasing sequence and an increasing
one yielding the same payoff), we introduce an adjustment 0    1 for dominance detection.
Imagine an avid dominance detector. If a substantive model, by its proper psychology, already
predicts high probabilities that dominant options will be chosen, then the adjustment is small (
close to zero); conversely, if the model predicts low probabilities that dominant options will be
chosen, then the adjustment is large ( close to one). The predicted probability of choosing the
dominant over the dominated option is given as:
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where iPˆ is the probability of choosing the dominant option, as the combined result of the model
and dominance detection.
The weighing parameters of TM and SM were transformed into relative weights, thus
encouraging an independent role of  in the distribution function and making values easier to
interpret. For TM, the accumulated utilities were weighted by 1 / (1 + ), and duration by * =  /
(1 + ). Analogously, for SM, the accumulated utilities were weighted by 1 / (1 + || + ||), the
improvement scores by * =  / (1 + || + ||), and the spreading scores by * =  / (1 + || + ||).
For all three models, we specified the utility function as the power function u(x) = x (e.g.,
Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014) with 0    5, and assumed a uniform prior
distribution over its entire range.6 For  and , we assumed the same uniform prior between zero
and one. For the regulation parameter , we assumed a uniform prior over the range of 0 to 100.
For TM, we specified, as mentioned in Footnote 5, the time-weighing function as the identity
function ttw ˆ)ˆ(  , and let  have a uniform prior from 0 to 100. For SM, we allowed participants
to either like ( > 0) or dislike ( < 0) improvement, and to either like ( > 0) or dislike ( < 0)
spreading. Both parameters were given uniform prior distributions from 100 to 100. The priors
for , , and  cover the entire range from exclusive weight of accumulated utilities and
(practically) exclusive weight of the model components associated with , , and . Additional
analyses with different sets of prior distributions produced qualitatively the same headline results.7
Model recovery
We will estimate models with four to five parameters from individual choice behavior in
26 binary choice tasks. Because information is relatively scarce, one might wonder whether the
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information is sufficient at all to identify the “right” model. We therefore undertook a model-
recovery exercise. At each step in the exercise, a parameter set was drawn from the prior of the
generating model, and one individual’s worth of data were generated from those parameters. The
marginal likelihoods were found for the data, and the winning model was selected, thus treated as
the recovered model. This procedure was repeated 1,000 times for each of the models taking a
turn as the generating model. The results are reported in Table 4. The rate of model recovery is
high: On more than 87% of the 4,000 occasions, the generating model was successfully recovered.
We therefore conclude that the information provided by our experimental paradigm is sufficient to
identify the “right” model.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Parameter estimation
While our model recovery exercise demonstrated that we could identify the best model
using individual data, the best parameters for individuals were not as easily identifiable. As shown
in the supplemental material, the posterior distributions over parameters for each individual were
broad and sometimes multimodal, so any single point does not provide a good summary of these
distributions.8 Instead, we ran a secondary analysis to identify the best parameters. Participants
were split into groups according to which model produced the highest marginal likelihood for
their individual data. The data of each group were aggregated, and the aggregate data was used to
determine the posterior distribution over the parameters for the model associated with that group.
Thus, the posterior distribution over parameters for each model was determined using a different
group of participants.
We needed a new approximation to calculate the posterior distributions, because the
simple approximation we used in the individual-analyses does not work well when the posterior
distributions are narrow. Thus, in the group-level analyses, we used the Metropolis-Hastings
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algorithm, which is a Markov chain Monte Carlo method that starts in a particular state, and
produces a chain of states that are used as samples from the posterior distribution over parameters.
We started each chain using a random draw from the prior distribution and collected one million
states for each chain, discarding the first half so as to remove the influence of the arbitrary starting
state. During this “burn-in period,” we continually recalibrated the proposal distribution, i.e., the
distribution that determined what the next state could be, by setting the covariance of the Gaussian
proposal distribution to a constant multiple of the sample covariance of a recent set of states, plus
a small additive diagonal factor, in order to ensure the covariance matrix did not collapse to zero
(Rosenthal, 2011). The samples were summarized by finding both the median of each parameter
and the Highest Density Interval (HDI), which was the single shortest continuous interval that
contained 95% of the posterior distribution. Across two runs of this analysis using random starting
points for the sampler, we found consistent medians and HDIs.
Main contest and parallel contest
We run a “main contest” and a “parallel contest” between models. The main contest is
between complete specifications of the four substantive psychological models, i.e., TM, DIUM,
SMNZ, and SMZ. The parallel contest is between the same models, and reduced forms of these
models, either by setting  to zero, or by setting  to zero, or by setting both  and  to zero. We
next explain the logic behind this.
In the main contest, each candidate model includes the parameter  , an adjustment for
dominance detection. This parameter increases the probability of choosing the dominant option;
when it is zero, an individual has no stronger proclivity toward the dominant option than is given
by the model. The adjustment parameter, however, does make the models less parsimonious, so
that, when dominance detection is modest, models without the adjustment parameter might, by
their parsimony, fare better. In the Appendix, we specify all four models with and without the
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adjustment parameter, and report the relative performance of the models accordingly, but we are
generally interested in how the models perform regardless of whether increased parsimony pays
off or not, just as we are interested, in the main contest, in how the models perform regardless of
whether  is high or low.
Another aspect of the main contest is that we only include substantive psychological
models as candidates. Each model, however, includes, as in modeling exercises elsewhere, the
parameter , which regulates the degree to which choice probabilities are determined by the
model; when it is zero, choice is totally random. As choice becomes increasingly random, a
Random-choice model (RM) might, by its parsimony, fare better than any substantive
psychological model. In the Appendix, we include RM as a fifth model. When specified without
the parameter , RM holds that any choice is random; when specified with this parameter, RM
holds that choice is random unless one option dominates another, in which case choice of the
dominant option may become more likely. In our discussion of the results from the main contest,
we will refer to the results from the parallel contest.
Descriptive accuracy
While Bayes factors allow us to assess how well the models perform relative to one
another, they do not provide an absolute standard against which to measure the performance of
each model. So, in addition to the Bayes factors, we calculated Bayesian p-values, which measure
descriptive accuracy by evaluating the posterior predictions of a model against the observed data
(see Meng, 1994; Myung, Karabatsos, & Iverson, 2005). In particular, a Bayesian p-value is the
probability that the discrepancy between the model and the posterior predicted data is greater than
the discrepancy between the model and the observed data, p{T(Drep) > T(D)|D, M}, with values
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below the conventional threshold of .05 meaning that it is unlikely that the observed data would
have arisen from a particular model, or that the model does not fit well.
A discrepancy function T must be chosen to evaluate the “closeness” of the data to the
model. While the Pearson chi-square discrepancy function is a common choice (Myung et al.,
2005), the predicted probabilities from our model were often within machine precision of zero or
one, which makes that discrepancy function difficult to work with. Instead, we chose the sum-of-
squares discrepancy function
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where are the data from each individual choice i. Using the discrepancy function T, the formula
for the Bayesian p-value is
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where I is an indicator function that is 1 if the argument is true and 0 if it is false.
As with the Bayes factors, the Bayesian p-value needs to be approximated. To do this, we
follow a procedure similar to that for approximating the Bayes factors for individual participants.
Specifically, we drew samples from P(|M), and, for each sample, we generated a single Drep by
sampling choices using the choice probabilities predicted by model M with parameters . We
calculated the discrepancies T(D) and T(Drep) using the predictions generated by model M using
parameters . If, while iterating over the samples, T(Drep) > T(D), we added p(D|, M) / p(D|M) to
the Bayesian p-value, otherwise we added nothing.
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Results
Table 3 shows the percentages of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
supporting the respective models in the Bayesian analyses, to be reported shortly, and among all
those participating in the experiment. The results for choice pairs #2 to #4 confirm the results
from Manzini et al. (2010) and Gigliotti and Sopher (1997): Participants preferred a constant
sequence to an increasing one, and they preferred a decreasing sequence to an increasing one, but
their preference between a decreasing sequence and a constant one was basically undecided.
Figure 2 depicts the proportions of participants whose support for one model over all other
candidate models in the main contest is, by informal rules of thumb (Jeffreys, 1961; Wetzels et al.,
2011), anecdotal (both Bayes Factors greater than one), substantial (both BFs greater than three),
strong (both BFs greater than 10), very strong (both BFs greater than 30), and decisive (both BFs
greater than 100). TM receives the most support; e.g., it receives substantial support from over
40% of the participants, while the other candidate models together receive substantial support
from under 20% of the participants.
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
For a strictly quantitative assessment of relative performance (without reliance on rather
arbitrary rules of thumb), we averaged posterior probabilities (the ratios between which are, under
the assumption of equal priors, the Bayes Factors) of the respective models across participants,
yielding .54 for TM, .17 for DIUM, .16 for SMNZ, and .12 for SMZ. Figure A1 depicts the
average posterior probabilities of the five candidate models (with or without adjustment for
dominance detection) in the parallel contest. TM performs best, and RM performs second best,
suggesting that participants engaged in a fair amount of guessing. Moreover, RM obtains more
support with adjustment for dominance detection than without, suggesting that guessing was not
just a matter of distraction or carelessness, but rather of not knowing what to do in the absence of
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dominance relations. Table A1 shows how the supporters of the four candidate models in the main
contest distribute across the five candidate models in the parallel contest. The participants either
stay with their model or switch to RM. In raw numbers, most switches are from TM to RM, but
that is because there are so many more supporters of TM; it is, actually, a minority that switches
from TM to RM, just as we see minorities switching from DIUM to RM, and from SMZ to RM.
Among supporters of SMNZ, on the other hand, we see a true exodus to RM, with over 70% of
the supporters taking part in it, meaning that SMNZ is particularly prone to attracting individuals
with “noisy” choice behavior.
Bayes Factors and posterior probabilities inform us about the relative performance of the
models, not about how well each model describes the choices of those best described by it. Figure
3 depicts the observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
lending anecdotal support to the respective models in the main contest (horizontal), plotted against
the average predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models
(vertical). Not surprisingly, each model describes the choices of its supporters best. Interesting is
how TM and DIUM describe the supporters of one another. Most choice pairs, except for #1 to
#4, were selected for generating an ordinal contrast between preference entailed by duration (TM,
with linear utility) and preference entailed by Net Present Value (DIUM, with linear utility). Table
3 shows that supporters of TM indeed mostly prefer the low NPV option, whereas supporters of
DIUM mostly prefer the high NPV option, and Figure 3 shows that TM tends to underpredict high
NPV choices among supporters of DIUM, whereas DIUM tends to overpredict high NPV choices
among supporters of TM (as the sequences model do as well).
<Insert Figure 3 about here>
For a quantitative assessment of descriptive accuracy, Table A2 shows the proportions of
Bayesian p-values lower than .05 among participants lending anecdotal support to the respective
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models in the parallel contest. Not counting RM without dominance detection, which holds that
each choice is a coin toss, and therefore receives a Bayesian p-value of zero by definition, the
models fit well overall, with TM, whether with or without adjustment for dominance detection,
showing no p-values lower than .05. When specified with adjustment for dominance detection,
SMZ also does not show p-values lower than .05, and nor does RM, which means that, also in
terms of descriptive accuracy, a combination of guessing and dominance detection captures well
what a portion of our participants is doing. Across specifications, DIUM is least accurate, and
SMNZ second-least accurate.
Table 5 provides, for each model, the medians of the parameter posteriors, along with the
lower and upper bounds of the 95% Highest Density Intervals (HDIs). In all four models, the
utility function is concave (i.e.,  < 1), thus exhibiting diminishing sensitivity. This argues against
all explanations of prior evidence that resorted to convex utility.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Concavity of the utility function is least pronounced among supporters of TM, and most
pronounced among supporters SMNZ and SMZ, which may seem counterintuitive, since the
sequences models include a desire for spreading ( > 0) as a separate component, which would
seem to relieve the utility function from capturing any desire for spreading through concave utility
( < 1). This would be the case, however, if the spreading component and concave utility would
both favor an option for approximating a uniform distribution. But this is not what the spreading
component does: It disfavors an option for departing from a uniform distribution. The result is a
hydraulic relationship between the spreading component, which disfavors an option for departing
from a uniform distribution, and concave utility, which does favor an option for approximating a
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uniform distribution. Thus, not even in the sequences models,  provides a “pure” assessment of
diminishing sensitivity, independently from a desire for spreading.
While the HDIs for  are wide, so is the HDI for  in TM. This is because the utility
function of TM exhibits only slight concavity ( near to 1) over the outcomes of sequences that, in
any given choice pair, total the same amount, so that differences between the accumulated utilities
of the sequences change little across choice pairs. Therefore, TM explains choice behavior mostly
on the basis of differences between the durations of the sequences, which creates redundancy
between  and , in that higher values of  can more easily be compensated by lower values of .
For instance, if concavity vanishes, and the differences between the accumulated utilities of the
sequences are therefore always zero, an increase of  from 18.73 (lower bound of the HDI) to
100.00 (upper bound of the HDI), which is an increase of * (relative weight) from .9493 to
.9901, can be compensated by a decrease of  from 4.2350 to 4.0605 (taken at equal distance from
the median). In comparison to the narrow range of *, we obtain, for the sequences models, wider
ranges of * (between .79 and .46 for SMNZ, between .51 and .06 for SMZ) and * (between
.20 and .87 for SMNZ, between .48 and .93 for SMZ); yet, it can be concluded that these models
tend to converge on distaste for improvement and a desire for spreading.
Discussion
In a Bayesian contest among candidate models at the disaggregate level, the Tradeoff
Model (TM) came out as best describing most participants. In a parallel contest, RM came out as
the strongest competitor to TM, especially when, alongside the choice processes described by
these models, dominance detection was taken into account. The overall picture is that weighing
cumulative utility against the duration of utility accumulation, guessing, and dominance detection
go a long way in explaining the behavior of our participants.
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In Experiment 1, we compared the competing models with respect to their predictions
about the effects of revealing zero outcomes on aggregate choice behavior, and, in Experiment 2,
we compared the models with respect to their ability to describe individual choice behavior. In the
next experiment, we validate our disaggregate analysis against the asymmetric hidden-zero effect,
one thread of evidence from the theoretical introduction.
Experiment 3:
The Cumulative Weight of Nothing
We expect the asymmetric hidden-zero effect to be driven by those supporting the
Tradeoff Model (TM), since the later zero added to the smaller-sooner outcome (changing SS into
SS0) has cumulative weight, whereas the sooner zero added to the larger-later outcome (changing
LL into LL0) has not. In contrast, we expect those supporting the Discounted Instantaneous Utility
Model (DIUM) to be immune to zero outcomes, because zero outcomes have zero utilities, and
thus leave the discounted utilities of sequences unchanged.
Drawing on the analysis in Table 1, the No-Zero Sequences Model (SMNZ) would expect
the later zero to have an effect as far as a desire for improvement reinforces a desire for spreading,
and would expect the sooner zero to have no effect at all if the desire for improvement precisely
offsets the desire for spreading. SMNZ would expect a symmetric hidden-zero effect if the desire
for improvement eclipses the desire for spreading. The Zero Sequences Model (SMZ), however,
expects any hidden-zero effect to be symmetrical, because revealing one zero means that the other
zero will be inferred.
It should be emphasized that Bayesian analysis does not include the hidden-zero tasks
serving to evaluate the hidden-zero effect, so that the above derivations are truly predictions.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 848 British residents, recruited through Maximiles. The sample was 54%
female, with an average age of 42. The great majority (84%) were employed (61% full time), and
a large majority (91%) had an academic degree (61% bachelors, 25% masters, 6% PhD). For 50%
of the participants, the total combined income of all members of the family was between £20,000
and £59,999, for 23% it was £60,000 or more, and for 16% it was less than £20,000, with 11%
preferring not to report their income. Overall, the sample characteristics were very similar to those
in Experiment 2.
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 2, except that one set of three choice tasks
was added. These were choices between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later outcome, with the
smaller-sooner outcome being £150, £300, or £450 today, and the larger-later outcome being
£200, £400, and £600, respectively, in 1 year. Thus, the interest rate offered was held constant at
33.33%. Either no zero outcomes were stated, or only the sooner zero was stated, or only the later
zero was stated.
Procedure
The three hidden-zero tasks were presented first. Participants were asked to imagine for
these three decisions that they were entitled to receive money, that they would be given 2 options
to choose from, and that, in each case, they would have to select the option they preferred. The
order of the choice tasks was randomized across participants. Furthermore, the statement of zero
outcomes was manipulated between participants. As in past research on the hidden-zero effect, the
options were written in two consecutive lines, with LL (or LL0) always following SS (or SS0). The
rest of the procedure was identical to that in Experiment 2.
Cumulative Weighing of Time in Intertemporal Tradeoffs 40
Results
Bayesian model contests
Figure 2 depicts the proportions of participants lending progressively more convincing
support for one model over all other candidate models in the main contest. By the informal rules
of thumb, TM again receives the most support; e.g., it receives more than twice as much
substantial support as the other candidate models together. On average, posterior probabilities
were .53 for TM, .18 for DIUM, .17 for SMNZ, and .12 for SMZ, almost identical to those in
Experiment 2. Figure A1 depicts the average posterior probabilities of the five candidate models
in the parallel contest, also almost identical to those in Experiment 2. Table A1 shows how the
supporters of the four candidate models in the main contest distribute across the five candidate
models in the parallel contest, and they essentially do so in the same way as in Experiment 2.
Figure 4 depicts the observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among
those lending anecdotal support to the respective models in the main contest, plotted against the
average predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models, and
Table A2 shows the proportions of Bayesian p-values lower than .05 among those participants
lending anecdotal support to the respective models in the parallel contest. It is safe to conclude
that, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the results show a strong resemblance to those from
Experiment 2.
<Insert Figure 4 about here>
External validation against the asymmetric hidden-zero effect
Concerning the three hidden-zero tasks, we computed, for each participant, the proportion
of choices favoring the larger-later outcome (a measure of patience). The top panel of Figure 5
shows the results for those providing anecdotal support for the respective models. As expected,
DIUM supporters are not affected by zero outcomes. In contrast, those supporting TM, SMNZ,
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and SMZ are affected by them, but more so by the later zero than by the sooner one. Let pL, pS,
and pN be the average proportions of patient choices in the later-zero, sooner-zero, and no-zero
conditions, respectively. A measure of the asymmetry of the hidden-zero effect is then (pL  pN) 
(pS  pN) = pL  pS, where a strictly asymmetric hidden-zero effect is pL  pN > 0 and pS  pN = 0.
The asymmetry is more pronounced among those supporting TM, pL  pS = .18, 95% CI [.08; .28],
than among those supporting SMNZ, pL  pS = .08, 95% CI [.13; .29], and SMZ, pL  pS = .15,
95% CI [.13; .43], but those supporting TM do seem to be affected somewhat by the sooner zero,
pS  pN = .09, 95% CI [.02; .19]. We must realize, however, that we are including all participants
who provide anecdotal support for a model, several of whom do not lend convincing support to it.
The bottom panel of Figure 5 therefore shows the results among those lending progressively more
convincing support to TM. We see the asymmetric hidden-zero effect that we expected: An effect
of the later zero, but no effect of the sooner one, among those lending substantial support, pL  pN
= .27, 95% CI [.16; .38], pS  pN = .06, 95% CI [.06; .19], among those lending strong support,
pL  pN = .19, 95% CI [.06; .32], pS  pN = .02, 95% CI [.13; .17], among those lending very
strong support, pL  pN = .24, 95% CI [.09; .39], pS  pN = .01, 95% CI [.17; .18], and among
those lending decisive support, pL  pN = .24, 95% CI [.05; .43], pS  pN = .05, 95% CI [.27;
.16].
<Insert Figure 5 about here>
Discussion
The results from Experiment 3 confirm that the asymmetric hidden-zero effect is driven by
those supporting the Tradeoff Model (TM): Among those individuals, the later zero has an effect
but the sooner zero has not, while, among those supporting the Discounted Instantaneous Utility
Cumulative Weighing of Time in Intertemporal Tradeoffs 42
Model (DIUM), neither zero has an effect. This constitutes an external validation of both models,
and, for TM, it corroborates the cumulative weighing of time.
The Sequences Model (SM), however, fails the test of external validity. Among supporters
of both variants, there were indications that both zeroes produced a rise in patience, but that the
later zero produced a greater rise in patience than the sooner zero. For the No-Zero Sequences
Model (SMNZ), this would mean that a desire for improvement outweighs a desire for spreading,
whereas we see in Table 5 that distaste for improvement outweighed a desire for spreading. For
the Zero Sequences Model (SMZ), any asymmetry of the hidden-zero effect is at odds with its
assumption that, once a decision involves outcome sequences, concealed zeroes are inferred by
the decision maker.
As to the Bayesian model contest itself, the overall picture that emerges from it is the same
as in Experiment 2: Weighing cumulative utility against the duration of utility accumulation,
guessing, and dominance detection go a long way in explaining the behavior of our participants.
Experiment 4:
Top It Up
In Experiment 4 we conducted an incentivized version of our previous experiments. This
was done at the University of Warwick, with participants being entered into a lottery where they
had a 1:40 chance that one of their choices would be paid out for real. Earnings were in the form
of “Eating at Warwick” top ups (see [http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/services/retail/eating]), which
can be added to the ID cards of every student and staff member at the University of Warwick.
Primarily, as the name implies, the card is used for eating at university restaurants and coffee
shops, but it can also be used to purchase groceries, theatre tickets (at the Warwick Arts Center),
and books (at the university bookstore). These cards can be preloaded by anyone who has the
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person’s student or staff number. For instance, parents can prepay for their child’s food by topping
up their cards from home. These prepayments take effect immediately.
Method
Participants and payments
Participants were 239 students from the University of Warwick, Coventry, Great Britain.
(Three participants were dropped from further analysis due to a programming error.) They were
recruited on the University of Warwick’s research participation system (SONA), and participated
in exchange for a promise that six participants would receive one of their choices, worth up to
£80, paid for real. On average, the sample was 19 years of age, with 59% being female.
Stimuli
The outcomes from Experiments 2 and 3 were divided by 20, yielding outcomes of £10,
£20, £30, and £40. Real total payoffs therefore ranged from £20 (if choice pair #12 were selected
for payout) to £80 (if choice pair #5 were selected for payout). Furthermore, the delays from the
previous experiments were divided by six, yielding delays of two, four, and six months. All else
about the stimuli remained the same.
Procedure
The experiment was run online, on November 5, 2014. In the introduction to the online
questionnaire, participants were informed that they would make 26 decisions between payment
plans, and that the payment plans were Eating at Warwick top ups on their student card. They
were told that every plan would specify a top up amount to be paid in two months (January 5,
2015), in four months (March 5, 2015), and in six months (May, 5 2015), and that, for every
choice they made, there would be a chance it would be paid for real. They were further told that
six participants would be chosen at random, and that the chosen participants would actually be
given one of their preferred plans. The instruction then read: “To enable us to enter you in the
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draw please provide your email address.” They were informed that everybody would receive a
number upon completion of the experiment, and that the experimenter would randomly select six
of these numbers; if their number was selected, one of the choices they made would be picked at
random and paid out for real. They were further informed that everyone would receive an email
listing the randomly selected numbers, and that the participants with these numbers would be sent
a separate email stating what they would receive and when.
The next page of the instruction presented a rehearsal task, analogous to the one used in
Experiments 2 and 3. After the rehearsal trial, participants were reminded that each option they
chose might be paid out for real, so that they would have to choose carefully.
Results
Figure 2 depicts the proportions of participants lending progressively more convincing
support for one model over all other candidate models in the main contests. By the informal rules
of thumb, TM is still the best performing model, but it faces fiercer competition from SMZ, and
especially from DIUM; e.g., it receives 6.8% more substantial support than DIUM, its closest
competitor, but it receives 5.1% less substantial support than DIUM and the other candidate
models together. On average, the posterior probabilities were .36 for TM, .29 for DIUM, .13 for
SMNZ, and .22 for SMZ, also attesting to the rise of SMZ, and especially of DIUM. Figure A1
shows the average posterior probabilities of the five candidate models in the parallel contest, and a
stiff competition between the models is evident, with RM and DIUM now sharing the second
place, and each coming right after TM, which is still in the first place. All four substantive
psychological models obtained more support with adjustment for dominance detection than
without. Table A1 shows how the supporters of the four candidate models in the main contest
distribute across the five candidate models in the parallel contest, and they basically do so as in
the same way as in Experiments 2 and 3, except that there is less migration from SMNZ to RM.
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Figure 6 depicts the observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among
those lending anecdotal support to the respective models in the main contest, plotted against the
average predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models. There
is more dispersion around the identity line than in Experiments 2 and 3, especially for TM and
SMNZ. However, Table A2 shows that, when specified with adjustment for dominance detection,
all models in the parallel contest, including TM and SMNZ, hit the 0% rate of Bayesian p-values
lower than .05. TM remained at the 0% rate when specified without adjustment for dominance
detection, as did DIUM, meaning that, also in terms of descriptive accuracy, DIUM performed
better than in Experiments 2and 3.
<Insert Figure 6 about here>
Table 5 provides, for each model, the medians of the parameter posteriors, along with the
lower and upper bounds of the 95% Highest Density Intervals (HDIs). First, across the board, but
especially among those supporting SMNZ and SMZ, choice behavior is determined more by the
respective models (higher ), meaning that the choice behavior is less “noisy.” Second, while
adjustment for dominance detection () was, among supporters of DIUM, already low in previous
experiments, it dropped, among supporters of TM, SMNZ, and SMZ, to low levels as well, with
the lowest level reached by TM. This is consistent with the fact that, in the parallel contest, the
models benefited more than in Experiments 2 and 3 from an increased parsimony when the
adjustment parameter was suppressed. The reason why  goes to zero is a markedly reduced
probability of choosing the decreasing sequence instead of the constant sequence it dominates
(analogous to choice pair #3 in Table 3). Figure 6 plots the four choice pairs with dominance
relations as solid circles. The choice pair involving the decreasing and constant sequence is the
one far above the identity line, while the other three choice pairs involving dominance relations
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are reasonably close to that line. Thus, one does not want adjustment for dominance detection to
make matters worse.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 4, which introduced incentives, differ somewhat from those
in Experiments 2 and 3. Most importantly, we saw an increase in support for the Zero Sequences
Model (SMZ), which, as shown in Footnote 2, is the holistic analogue of atomistic discounting,
and especially the Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM). Why this change, and what to
conclude from it?
The differences between Experiment 4 and the previous experiments include smaller
outcome magnitudes, shorter delays, student population, less abstract outcomes, and the use of
non-hypothetical payoffs. All of these changes, especially the use of less abstract outcomes, may
have introduced motives in addition to those operating in the previous experiments. Importantly,
payment in the “Eating at Warwick” currency may have promoted a discounting of individual
outcome utilities, because later payoffs occurred close to the summer break, when many students
might be going home or even leaving the university altogether, and would no longer be using their
Eating at Warwick card. We thus ascribe the rise in support for DIUM to a trimmed time horizon
in the mind of the decision makers. If correct, this explanation offers an important insight into the
psychology of preferences for sequences, and into the variability of relative model performance
across settings.
The main goal of all the changes was to provide non-hypothetical payoffs. This might
bring decisions closer to the economic model and reduce errors in responding (e.g., Camerer &
Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). We indeed found choice behavior to be less “noisy.”
We also found a surge in support for DIUM. Because DIUM is similar to the NPV model, which
is the standard of economic rationality, one might infer that decisions were indeed brought “closer
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to the economic model.” However, the NPV model operates on money, whereas DIUM operates
on the instantaneous utility of money, as a result of which it actually moves away from economic
rationality by allowing for violations of dominance. Thus, increasing support for DIUM cannot be
automatically taken to be increasing support for “the economic model.” Moreover, even if DIUM
were taken to be the standard of economic rationality, it would definitely be less plausible that the
incentives “magically” led to a discounting of individual outcome utilities than that the incentives
led to a trimmed time horizon, which, in turn, led to a discounting of individual outcome utilities.
In any case, the Tradeoff Model (TM) still received more support than any other model in the
contest.
Finally, there is yet another indication that incentivization did not bring decisions closer to
the economic model: The choice between a decreasing and a constant sequence was no longer a
coin toss, which by itself is nonnormative, but rather strongly disfavored the decreasing sequence
in relation to the constant one. This is a gross violation of dominance, meaning that participants
indeed moved away from the economic model. The violation of dominance was problematic for
all models in the contest, in that they far overpredicted the probability of choosing the dominant
option.
Old Evidence from a New Perspective
Given that the Tradeoff Model (TM), with its cumulative weighing of time, emerges as the
winning model overall, the question becomes whether it can also accommodate previously
reported evidence on preferences for sequences of unlabeled monetary gains, which, without
exception, concerns aggregate choice behavior involving two-outcome sequences. We saw how it
accommodates the asymmetric hidden-zero effect, and how, in disaggregate choice behavior, it is
driven by those best described by TM, but what about the remaining evidence? Table 6 compiles
that evidence, which, with the exception of the asymmetric hidden-zero effect, was addressed by
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Read and Scholten (2012). In this section, we discuss how TM accommodates the listed anomalies
to choice by the Net Present Value model.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
Front-end amount effect and its reversal
We begin with the single one anomaly that TM, as specified in Equations (3a) and (3b),
does not explain, the one that Read and Scholten (2012) call the front-end amount effect, as first
reported by Rao and Li (2011). Consider a choice between “$10 today” (SS) and “$30 in two
months” (LL), and another between “$510 today” (SSF) and “$500 today and $30 in two months”
(LLF). The introduction of the common front-end amount of $500 decreases patience, i.e., the
probability of choosing LLF is lower than the probability of choosing LL. This contradicts TM as
specified in Equations (3a) and (3b). By a cumulative weighing of time, the delay of LL is two,
while the duration of LLF is shorter than two, which would benefit LLF. Furthermore, by concave
utility, the utility difference between the options in period 1 (“today”) is less strongly in favor of
SSF than it is in favor of SS, i.e., u(510) – u(500) < u(10) – u(0), which would benefit LLF as well.
On both counts, the front-end amount should increase patience.
The front-end amount effect must be appreciated along with a reversal of the effect, as
reported by Read and Scholten (2012). Consider a choice between “$510 today” (SSA) and “$530
in two months” (LLA), and another between “$1,510 today” (SSFA) and “$1,000 today and $530 in
two months” (LLFA). Now, the introduction of the common front-end amount of $1,000 increases
patience, i.e., the probability of choosing LLFA is higher than the probability of choosing LLA. This
is, of course, compatible with a cumulative weighing of time and concave utility, but, then, why
the front-end amount effect, and why its reversal?
At this point, it must be recognized that the prime motivation for developing the tradeoff
model were similarity effects (Scholten & Read, 2010), showing that intertemporal choices are
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influenced the similarity between the options along the time and outcome attributes. Accordingly,
we attribute the reversal of the front-end amount effect to the similarity of the options along the
outcome attribute upon introduction of the front-end amount.9 In the choice between SS and LL, a
large majority preferred LL, and, indeed, the interest rate on offer was 73.2% per month (72,800%
per year). Therefore, according to TM,
u(30) – u(10) > XT | w(2),
where the left-hand side is the outcome advantage of LL, and the right-hand side is the time
advantage of SS, with the former being larger than the latter, so that LL is preferred. In the
subscript to , which measures impatience, X is the outcome advantage, and T is the time
advantage, with T|X meaning that  also depends on the similarity of the outcomes, as explained
below. Upon introduction of the front-end amount, which leaves the interest rate unchanged, the
majority preference for LL shrunk toward indifference between SSF and LLF, which we write as:
u(30) – (u(510) – u(500)) =
FXT |
 w( Ftˆ ).
As discussed by Scholten and Read (2010),  can, in any given local context, acquire two values,
depending on “similarity.” The lower value applies when the time advantage of SS falls below a
threshold, and the higher value applies when the time advantage falls above the threshold. This
gives rise to a step function relating the time advantage to the weight assigned to the advantage
(see Scholten & Read, 2010, Figure 3). Crucially, the threshold depends on the relative similarity
of the outcomes and the delays. When the outcomes are treated as “dissimilar,” the threshold for
the time advantage of SS rises, and the time advantage is therefore more likely to be subthreshold;
this translates into the low value of , or less impatience. When the outcomes, on the other hand,
are seen as “similar,” the threshold for the time advantage of SS falls, and the time advantage is
thus more likely to be suprathreshold; this translates into the high value of , or more impatience.
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We argue that introduction of the front-end amount increases the similarity between the options
along the outcome attribute, and, because the outcomes are more likely to be treated as “similar,”
the time advantage of SS is more likely to be suprathreshold, i.e.,
FXT |
 > XT | . If this similarity
effect outweighs duration, by which Ftˆ < 2, and concave utility, by which u(510) – u(500) <
u(10), it drives the preference relation between SSF and LLF toward indifference.
In the choice between SSA and LLA, however, a large majority preferred SSA, and, indeed,
the interest rate on offer was now “only” 1.9% per month (still 26.0% per year).10 According to
TM,
u(530) – u(510) <
AXT |
 w(2).
Upon introduction of the front-end amount, the majority preference for SSF shrunk toward
indifference between SSFA and LLFA, which we write as:
u(530) – (u(1,510) – u(1,000)) =
FAXT |
 w( FAtˆ ),
where the similarity effect, i.e.,
FAXT |
 >
AXT |
 , countervails, but does not outweigh, duration, by
which FAtˆ < 2, and concave utility, by which u(1,510) – u(1,000) < u(510). One reason why
similarity no longer prevails may be that $1,510 and $1,000 (in the reverse front-end amount
effect) are less likely to be judged as “similar” than $510 and $500 (in the front-end amount
effect). The other reason is that, by concave utility, the difference between u(510) and u(1,510) –
u(1,000) is larger than the difference between u(10) and u(510) – u(500), meaning that concave
utility becomes more prevalent. Thus, TM can accommodate the front-end amount effect and its
reversal by combining duration and concave utility with similarity effects.
Relocation effect
Read and Scholten (2012) also reported what we call a relocation effect. Consider a choice
between “$510 today” (SSF) and “$500 today and $30 in two months” (LLF), and another between
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“$10 today and $500 in two months” (SSB) and “$530 in two months” (LLB). Thus, the common
amount of $500 is relocated from the front end in the first choice to the back end in the second
choice. Relocation decreases patience, i.e., the probability of choosing LLB is lower than the
probability of choosing LLF, although it leaves the interest rate unchanged. Formally, we might
have:
u(30) – (u(510) – u(500)) =
FXT |
 w( Ftˆ ),
and
(u(530) – u(500)) – u(10) <
BXT |
 (w(2) – w( Btˆ )).
Assuming that $530 and $500 are not less likely to be treated as “similar” than $510 and $500, the
relocation effect arises when concave utility outweighs duration. The time disadvantage of LLB is
smaller than that of LLF, i.e., 2 – Btˆ < 1 while Ftˆ > 1. Countervailing duration is concave utility,
by which the outcome advantage of LLB is smaller than that of LLF, i.e., u(530) < u(30) + u(500)
and u(500) – u(10) < u(510). The effect of concave utility can be expected to be substantial,
because the utility decrements from u(30) to u(530) u(500), and from (u(510)  u(500)) to –
u(10), are substantial (see also Read & Scholten, 2012, Figure 2). Thus, TM can accommodate the
relocation effect through concave utility, and the desire for spreading it generates.
Violations of independence
Three additional anomalies to the Net Present Value model are violations of independence
(Koopmans, 1960), a condition that is invoked in the axiomatic derivation of the discounted utility
model. Independence states that time periods yielding identically valued outcomes regardless of
one’s choice (a common consequence) should cancel out, and therefore not affect preference. The
evidence shows that adding a common consequence does affect preference. Loewenstein (1987)
provided a first demonstration in the domain of consumption, which, as shown by Loewenstein
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and Prelec (1993), can be accommodated by the sequences model. We continue to concentrate on
unlabeled monetary gains, and discuss violations of independence in that restricted domain.
Read and Scholten (2012) reported a violation that we call the common-consequence
effect. Consider a choice between “$300 today” (SS) and “$400 in 50 weeks” (LL), and another
between “$300 today and $350 in 4 weeks” (SSC) and “$350 in 4 weeks and $400 in 50 weeks”
(LLC). In the choice between SS and LL, few participants preferred LL, but, in the choice between
SSC and LLC, more participants preferred LLC, a small but reliable effect. Therefore, the common
consequence increases patience, i.e., the probability of choosing LLC is higher than the probability
of choosing LL. Formally, we might have:
u(400) – u(300) < XT | w(50),
and
(u(400) – u(300)) + (u(350) – u(350)) 
CXT |
 (w(
CLL
tˆ ) – w(
CSS
tˆ )).
Obviously, the common consequence does not affect the utility difference between the options,
but the common consequence is written down so as to imply that it increases, by the similarity
effect, the marginal impact of time, i.e.,
CXT |
 > XT | . Outweighing the similarity effect, however,
is the effect of duration: As a result of the common consequence, the duration of SSC is longer
than the delay of SS, i.e.,
CSS
tˆ > 0, and the duration of LLC is shorter than the delay of LL, i.e.,
CLL
tˆ
< 50, thus increasing patience. As mentioned earlier, the effect was small, and this analysis indeed
suggests a delicate balance between similarity and duration.
The remaining violations of independence in the literature involve common consequences
located before, rather than between, the smaller-sooner and the larger-later outcome. Urminsky
and Kivetz (2011) reported what they call a mere-token effect, by which the common consequence
increases patience, but does not increase patience much more as the token becomes larger. However,
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Read and Scholten (2012) showed, drawing on their formulation of the tradeoff model, that this
depends on how much larger the token becomes. Consider a choice between “$200 in one week”
(SS) and “$400 in one year” (LL), another between “$50 tomorrow and $200 in one week” (SSM)
and “$50 tomorrow and $400 in one year” (LLM), and yet another between “$5,000 tomorrow and
$200 in one week” (SSAM) and “$5,000 tomorrow and $400 in one year” (LLAM). A minority
preferred LL over SS, participants were equally divided SSM and LLM, and a majority preferred
LLAM over SSAM. Therefore, the probability of choosing LLM was higher (by a narrow but reliable
margin) than the probability of choosing LL, and the probability of choosing LLAM was higher (by
a wider margin) than the probability of choosing LLM. This result, which we call the amplification
effect, can be written as follows:
u(400) – u(200) < XT | (w(365) – w(7)),
(u(400) – u(200)) + (u(50) – u(50)) =
MXT |
 (w(
MLL
tˆ ) – w(
MSS
tˆ )), and
(u(400) – u(200)) + (u(5,000) – u(5,000)) >
AMXT |
 (w(
AMLL
tˆ ) – w(
AMSS
tˆ )).
The observed effects are, according to TM, carried entirely by duration. Figure 7 shows
how duration, under a cumulative weighing of time, decreases as the token increases, separately
for SS (which the tokens transform into SSM and SSAM) and LL (which the tokens transform into
LLM and LLAM). With the $50 token being introduced, the duration of SS decreases, under linear
utility, from seven to six days, whereas the duration of LL decreases more, from 365 to 329 days.
If duration outweighs the similarity effect, by which
MXT |
 > XT | , and diminishing sensitivity, by
which the marginal impact of delay or duration decreases with their length, i.e., )7()365( ww  ,
we obtain the mere-token effect. With the $50 token being replaced by a $5,000 token, the
duration of SS decreases, under linear utility, from six to four days, while the duration of LL
decreases much more, from 329 to 190 days. If, as is likely, duration outweighs diminishing
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sensitivity, we obtain the amplification effect. Therefore, the violations of independence seen in
the literature can be comprehensively dealt with by a cumulative weighing of time, which yields
the duration of utility accumulation.
<Insert Figure 7 about here>
Violations of dominance
A final piece of evidence concerns violations of dominance, as reported by Scholten and
Read (2014). One violation involved monetary gains. Consider a choice between “$75 today” (SS)
and “$100 in one year” (LL), and another between “$75 today and $5 in one year” (SSD), which
dominates SS, and “$100 in one year” (LLD), which is the same as LL. A large majority preferred
SS, but a minority preferred SSD. Another violation of dominance involved monetary losses.
Consider a choice between “paying $75 today” (SS) and paying $100 in one year” (LL), and
another between “paying $75 today and paying $5 in one year” (SSD), which is dominated by SS,
and “paying £100 in one year” (LLD), which is the same as LL. A majority preferred SS, but a
larger majority preferred SSD. The explanation offered by TM is that the duration of SSD is longer
than the delay of SS; with $75 today accumulating to $80 in one year, the duration will be “a bit
more than half a year,” significantly longer than “today.” With gains, this drastically decreases the
appeal of SSD, and, with losses, it increases the appeal of SSD (not as drastically, because, as we
will point out in the General Discussion, people differ in their time preference for losses). These
violations of dominance, involving losses as well as gains, can therefore also be dealt with by a
cumulative weighing of time.
General Discussion
Our theoretical and empirical analysis follows up on rather scarce research that has been
done on preferences for sequences of unlabeled monetary gains. We extended the intertemporal
tradeoff model (Read & Scholten, 2012) from two-period to multiple-period sequences, and
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proposed that people choose between sequences by trading off accumulated utilities of gains
against the duration of utility accumulation. In Experiment 1, aggregate choice behavior provided
qualitative support for the revised tradeoff model over its original specification, and over two
other candidate models from the literature: The discounted instantaneous utility model (which
holds that individuals discount the instantaneous utility of monetary outcomes, rather than, as
often assumed in the literature, the outcomes themselves) and Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993)
sequences model. In three subsequent experiments, the last one incentivized, disaggregate choice
behavior provided quantitative support for the tradeoff model in a Bayesian model contest. In
Experiment 3, we showed that the asymmetric hidden-zero effect, which was a prime motivation
for revising the tradeoff model, was indeed driven by those best described by the tradeoff model.
Finally, we showed how the revised tradeoff model can accommodate remaining evidence from
the literature, if it makes room for similarity effects, which was a prime motivation for developing
the tradeoff model (Scholten & Read, 2010).
Paramorphic representations of choice
The cumulative weighing of time should be appreciated as a paramorphic feature of the
tradeoff model, like other “gestalt” properties in models of decision making. Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), in proposing cumulative prospect theory, probably did not contend that people
actually go through the mathematically ingenious computation of decision weights; rather, the
computations were meant to capture the intuition that people are more sensitive to extreme
outcomes in a probability distribution than to intermediate ones (Fennema & Wakker, 1997).
Similarly, Loewenstein and Prelec (1993), in proposing the sequences model, probably did not
contend that people actually go through laborious comparisons between cumulative utilities
afforded by a sequence and those that would be afforded by a uniform sequence; rather, the
comparisons were meant to capture the intuition that people are sensitive to improvement and
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spreading of outcomes in a sequence. On a less speculative note, Loomes (2010), in proposing his
perceived relative argument model of risky choice, stressed that it is “a model of decisions often
made quite quickly and on the basis of perceptions rather than after long deliberation involving
complex calculation. The structure of the model is therefore intended to capture tendencies in the
ways perceptions are formed and judgments are made: it is not suggested that people actually
make calculations strictly according to the formulae but, rather, that the formulae capture key
features of the ways in which decision parameters are perceived and processed.” In the same
spirit, the cumulative weighing of time is meant to capture the intuition that people are sensitive to
how quickly the outcomes in a sequence accumulate: “How much utility do I get until this point in
time, how much do I get until that point, and how long does it take?”
The tradeoff model as an attribute-based choice model
In contrast with choice between single dated outcomes, which, according to Scholten et al.
(2014), follows a stochastic ratio rule, choice between outcome sequences was assumed to follow
a stochastic difference rule. If, as in Equation (3b), the difference between weighted durations is
traded off against differences in accumulated utilities by a currency parameter , rather than a
nonlinear tradeoff function Q (Scholten & Read, 2010; Scholten et al., 2014), the tradeoff model
might be rearranged into an (arithmetically) “discounted utility” model, in which choice would be
alternative based rather than attribute based. However, as mentioned in the introduction, this
interpretation of the tradeoff model has the undesirable characteristic that a sequence of positive
outcomes might receive a negative “discounted utility.” Moreover, as discussed in the previous
section, even choice between sequences can be susceptible to similarity effects, which expose
attribute-based comparisons.
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Features of sequences
We examined the feasibility of our approach to preferences for sequences in experiments
that adopted standard practice in research on this topic, which is that the options afford the same
total amount of money, and that the money is distributed over contiguous future time periods.
Future model contests should be run under less restrictive conditions. As discussed earlier, the
sequences model holds that discounting of individual outcome utilities interacts with the “gestalt”
properties of outcomes sequences (improvement and spreading) when a sequence starts in (or
close to) the present (e.g., 0, 1, 2) or when time periods are noncontiguous (e.g., 1, 2, 10). The
tradeoff model would continue to operate as it does with contiguous future time periods, although
it would be necessary to allow the time-weighting function w to exhibit diminishing sensitivity to
delays, so as to capture the disproportionate impact of shorter durations of outcome sequences.
Similarly, the discounted instantaneous utility model would continue to operate as it does with
contiguous future time periods, although it would be necessary to generalize the exponential
discount function, which exhibits constant sensitivity, into a hyperbolic discount function, which
exhibits diminishing sensitivity, and thus captures the disproportionate impact of shorter delays to
the outcomes in a sequence.
Future model contests should also consider choices between options that afford different
total amounts of money. In the introduction, we gave the example of a choice between the rising
profile {$100, $150} and the falling profile {$150, $100}, in which the options afford the same
total amount of money, and therefore imply a 0% interest rate. One alternative to this would be a
choice between {$100, $250} and {$200, $100}, which, as the choice between $100 in one year
and $150 in two years, implies a 50% interest rate. We used options with the same total payoffs
not only to ensure continuity with past research, but also, and much more importantly, to ensure
identification of choice tasks in which the Net Present Value model would dictate a certain choice
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regardless of the discount rate, and the tradeoff model, by the duration of outcome accumulation,
would dictate the opposite choice. We thus obtained a particularly strong contrast between the
tradeoff model and the model of economic rationality, but future research might be guided by
other motives.
Money and consumption
Most empirical research on preferences for sequences has used sequences of consumption
experiences or labeled monetary money starting either in the present or in the future (Chapman,
1996; Guyse et al., 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991;
Matsumoto et al., 2000; Read & Powell, 2002). We tried to tap into “raw” preferences for
sequences, or preferences purely driven by the magnitudes of, and delays to, the outcomes in the
sequence, by using sequences of unlabeled future money, thus reducing the role of factors like
expectations, which might exist in preferences for profiles of wage payments or life-time health
(Chapman, 1996), the difference in uncertainty between present and future money (Epper, Fehr-
Duda, & Bruhin, 2011; Halevy, 2008), and satiation with consumption experiences that money
can buy (Reuben, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2010; Baucells & Sarin, 2007). Loewenstein and Prelec
(1993) partly motivated the sequences model with the evidence on preferences for sequences of
income from labor or rent (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991), but applied the model (equivalent
the Zero Sequences Model) to preferences for sequences of consumption experiences, and found
that it outperformed a consumption analogue of the discounted instantaneous utility model. In our
application of the models to preferences for sequences of unlabeled future money, it was the other
way around. More must be done to better understand the variability of relative model performance
across settings, and thus come to further insight into the psychology of preferences for sequences.
It must be recognized, however, that consumption decisions, although a legitimate focus of
inquiry, do complicate a controlled analysis of intertemporal preferences. Reuben et al. (2010)
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identified a number of hurdles for a controlled analysis of intertemporal consumption decisions:
Not only do consumption goods easily lead to satiation (e.g., 100 candy bars in one year; see Estle
et al., 2007), they also differ from individual to individual in their desirability (some love candy
bars, others hate them), they introduce intertemporal uncertainty about tastes (how much will I
like a candy bar in one year?), and they are not easily divisible into an arbitrary number of units
(trading off two candy bars in one year against one candy bar today already entails a 100% yearly
interest rate). Money removes all hurdles in one sweep. As Abdellaoui et al. (2010) conclude: “It
is hard to see how one could construct sequences of, say, candy bars like we did for money
amounts and, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been able to measure the utility of
consumption for intertemporal choice. Developing methods to measure the intertemporal utility
for consumption is an important topic for future research but as yet this cannot be fulfilled” (p.
861).
The distinction between money and consumption is also important from a theoretical
perspective, and Abdellaoui et al. (2010) actually made the above observations in discussing
economic theory. Economic analyses of intertemporal choice have been dominated by
Samuelson’s (1937) Discounted Utility (DU) model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). Like the Net
Present Value (NPV) model, the DU model assumes that the future is discounted exponentially,
but unlike the NPV model, which is defined over monetary outcomes, the DU model is defined
over consumption. The complete picture of the connection between the NPV model and the DU
model is as follows: (1) Given two monetary sequences, choose the one with the highest NPV at
the prevailing interest rate, because it places you on the highest attainable intertemporal budget
constraint (the income decision), and, (2) given the intertemporal budget constraint, choose the
consumption stream with the highest DU (the consumption decision). Analyses of choices
between monetary sequences place us in stage (1), and psychological models, including the
Cumulative Weighing of Time in Intertemporal Tradeoffs 60
Discounted Instantaneous Utility model, question the NPV model as an accurate description of
how people make these choices. Abdellaoui et al. (2010) basically argue that, given the problems
in measuring intertemporal utility for consumption, this is the best we can do, which, according to
the authors, “seems to lead to the undesirable conclusion that economics is unable to quantify one
of its principal models” (p. 861).
Sequences of losses
A natural thing to do is to extend the analysis from preferences for sequences of gains to
preferences of sequences of losses (Guyse & Simon, 2011). As our discussion of Scholten and
Read’s (2014) violations of dominance (in the previous section) suggests, the tradeoff model, with
its cumulative weighing of time, may apply equally well to preferences for sequences of losses as
to preferences for sequences of gains. The aggregate data showed positive time preference, in that
a longer duration was better. However, it is likely that these aggregate data conceal disaggregate
diversity. Yates and Watts (1975) showed that only half of their participants preferred to pay an
amount of money later rather than sooner (positive time preference); the other half preferred to
pay it sooner rather than later (negative time preference). Hardisty, Appelt, and Weber (2013)
showed that negative time preference for monetary losses may transpire even in aggregate data. In
response to this evidence, Scholten et al. (2016) extended the tradeoff model to accommodate
heterogeneity in preferences for single dated losses; when applied to preferences for sequences of
losses, the tradeoff model must take that heterogeneity into consideration as well, as, indeed, any
model should.
Sequences of gains and losses
Further complications arise if we broaden the scope to sequences that combine gains and
losses. These come even closer to the real-life examples with which we started this paper. The
versatile discounted instantaneous utility model, with its atomistic approach to preferences for
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sequences, can readily be extended to mixed sequences. It is not immediately obvious how the
tradeoff model and the sequences model can be extended to mixed sequences; perhaps, drawing
on the property of gain-loss separability from prospect theory (Wu & Markle, 2008), it may be
that people evaluate the gain and loss parts of the sequences separately; thus, in the tradeoff
model, the cumulative weighing of time would occur separately in the two domains, and so
would, in the sequences model, the computation of improvement and spreading scores.
The issue of mixed sequences lies wide open as an avenue for future research. There is
some evidence (Jiang, Hu, & Zhu, 2014; Rao & Li, 2011; Scholten & Read, 2014; Sun & Jiang,
2015), and a common pattern is that the introduction of mixed sequences increases patience. It
may, more generally, be that sequences reduce the salience of time: In choice between single
dated outcomes, one only needs to attend to two different outcomes occurring at two different
delays, but, when choice involves sequences, the evolution of outcomes must be tracked over
time, which may draw attention away from delays, and toward the outcomes (Jiang et al., 2014;
Shu & Jiang, 2015). However, our analysis shows that there is much more to preferences for
sequences than just an overall rise in patience, and past evidence on preference for unmixed
sequences already attests to this, in the form of the asymmetric hidden-zero effect, the front-end
amount effect, the relocation effect, and the amplification effect (see Table 6). The evidence
presented in this paper further exposes the rich psychology behind preferences for sequences.
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Appendix:
Parallel Contest
In this Appendix, we report the results of a contest, paralleling the main contest, between
five candidate models. There are the four substantive psychological models from the main contest.
Then there is the Random-choice Model (RM), which is technically a reduced version of any of
the four substantive psychological models (when  is zero). Each of the five candidate models was
specified either with or without a parameter for dominance detection (), making for 10 models in
total. Figure A1 shows the posterior probabilities of the five candidate models in the parallel
contest, averaged across participants, with the dark and light shades indicating the parts of the
support obtained with and without the parameter for dominance detection. Table A1 shows how
the supporters of the four candidate models in the main contest distribute across the five candidate
models in the parallel contest. Each of the five candidate models takes the posterior probabilities
of its variant with adjustment for dominance detection and its variant without adjustment for
dominance detection, averaged across the posterior probabilities of all 10 models in the parallel
contest. Averaging posteriors is the same as having an average prior for , i.e., an average of the
prior with a spike at zero and the prior with a uniform distribution over the interval from 0 to 1.
Table A2 shows the proportions of Bayesian p-values lower than .05, an aggregate measure of
badness of fit, among those lending anecdotal support to the respective models in the parallel
contest.
<Insert Figure A1 about here>
<Insert Table A1 about here>
<Insert Table A2 about here>
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TABLE 1. Threads of evidence as dealt with by the Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM),
the Sequences Model (SM), and the Tradeoff Model (TM).
Model
Thread of evidence
Undecided preference
between decreasing and
constant sequences Asymmetric hidden-zero effect
Preference for faster
accumulation, i.e.,
{1,000, 0, 1,000}  {0, 500, 0}
DIUM
Concave utility countervails
discounting
Unaccounted for
Convex utility outweighs
discounting
SM
(1) Distaste for improvement
countervailed by concave
utility and a desire for
spreading; (2) distaste for
improvement and spreading
countervailed by concave
utility; (3) convex utility and
distaste for improvement
countervailed by a desire for
spreading; (4) a desire for
improvement countervailed
by convex utility and distaste
for spreading; (5) a desire for
improvement and spreading
countervailed by convex
utility; (6) concave utility and
a desire for improvement
countervailed by distaste for
spreading
Concealed zeroes are not
inferred; with the later zero
(SS0), a desire for
improvement reinforces a
desire for spreading; with the
sooner zero (LL0), a desire for
improvement countervails a
desire for spreading
(1) Concealed zeroes are not
inferred; convex utility; (2)
concealed zeroes are inferred;
convex utility reinforces
distaste for spreading or
outweighs a desire for
spreading; (3) concealed
zeroes are inferred; distaste for
spreading outweighs concave
utility
TM
Cumulative weighing of time
countervails concave utility
Cumulative weighing of time
Cumulative weighing of time
outweighs concave utility
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TABLE 2. Sequences, duration under a linear utility function, and 95% confidence
intervals (LOWER, UPPER) for percentages of participants (%H) choosing the high NPV
option when zeroes are not revealed (N = 356) and when they are revealed (N = 347), in
Experiment 1.
#
No-zero condition
High NPV Low NPV Confidence interval
t1 t2 t3 tˆ t1 t2 t3 tˆ LOWER %H UPPER
1 300 300 2.33 600 2.00 38.11 43.26 48.40
2 400 200 2.20 600 2.00 47.34 52.53 57.72
3 400 400 2.33 800 2.00 38.11 43.26 48.40
4 600 200 2.14 800 2.00 49.04 54.21 59.39
#
Zero condition
High NPV Low NPV Confidence interval
t1 t2 t3 tˆ t1 t2 t3 tˆ LOWER %H UPPER
1 300 0 300 2.25 0 600 0 2.50 56.26 61.38 66.51
2 400 0 200 2.14 0 600 0 2.50 57.15 62.25 67.35
3 400 0 400 2.25 0 800 0 2.50 55.38 60.52 65.66
4 600 0 200 2.10 0 800 0 2.50 61.31 66.28 71.26
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TABLE 3. Choice pairs and percentages of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
supporting the Tradeoff Model (TM, n = 317), the Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM, n
= 80), the No-Zero Sequences Model (SMNZ, n = 78), and the Zero Sequences Model (SMZ, n = 45),
and among all those participating in Experiment 2 (Sample, N = 520).
#
High NPV Low NPV Model Supported
Samplet1 t2 t3 t1 t2 t3 TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ
1 800 400 200 200 400 800 77.92 81.25 65.38 68.89 75.77
2 600 400 200 200 400 600 77.29 77.50 65.38 68.89 74.81
3 600 400 200 400 400 400 51.42 61.25 65.38 44.44 54.42
4 400 400 400 200 400 600 90.22 85.00 74.36 82.22 86.35
5 800 800 600 200 800 48.90 40.00 65.38 35.56 48.85
6 800 200 200 800 26.50 73.75 66.67 62.22 42.88
7 600 200 200 600 20.82 65.00 58.97 66.67 37.31
8 400 200 200 400 10.41 60.00 47.44 62.22 28.08
9 600 200 800 37.22 91.25 50.00 55.56 49.04
10 400 200 600 31.55 95.00 53.85 46.67 45.96
11 400 400 800 22.71 90.00 44.87 53.33 39.04
12 200 200 400 21.14 85.00 34.62 48.89 35.38
13 200 200 200 600 42.27 90.00 37.18 64.44 50.77
14 200 400 200 800 35.96 83.75 38.46 62.22 45.96
15 400 200 200 800 40.06 92.50 43.59 64.44 50.77
16 400 400 200 200 800 28.08 80.00 53.85 68.89 43.46
17 600 400 200 400 800 27.44 82.50 50.00 64.44 42.50
TABLE 3 TO BE CONTINUED
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TABLE 3. Continued.
18 800 400 200 600 800 26.18 73.75 52.56 71.11 41.35
19 800 200 400 600 20.82 53.75 60.26 53.33 34.62
20 800 200 600 400 11.36 47.50 43.59 57.78 25.77
21 600 200 400 400 10.73 43.75 38.46 53.33 23.65
22 600 200 200 400 600 25.87 85.00 50.00 75.56 42.88
23 600 200 200 200 800 39.75 88.75 62.82 66.67 53.08
24 800 600 600 400 400 18.93 38.75 44.87 37.78 27.50
25 600 600 400 400 400 9.78 27.50 29.49 28.89 17.12
26 400 800 200 400 600 17.67 36.25 42.31 24.44 24.81
aChoice pairs #10, #11, and #9 correspond to choice pairs #2, #3, and #4 in Table 2.
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TABLE 4. Model recovery exercise. Proportions
of occasions, out of 1,000, in which a generating
model was recovered as a candidate model, out
of four.
Generating
model
Recovered model
TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ
TM 0.94 0.01 0.02 0.03
DIUM 0.12 0.80 0.06 0.02
SMNZ 0.01 0.08 0.89 0.03
SMZ 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.87
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TABLE 5. Medians (Md), along with the Lower bounds (L) and Upper bounds (U), of the 95% Highest Density
Intervals of model parameters in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (E2, E3, and E4), among those supporting the Tradeoff
Model (TM, n = 312, 498, and 91), the Discounted Instantaneous Utility Model (DIUM, n = 80, 137, and 81), the
No-Zero Sequences Model (SMNZ, n = 80, 142, and 23), and the Zero Sequences Model (SMZ, n = 48, 71, and
41).
TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ
L Md U L Md U L Md U L Md U
E2
 3.90 4.15 4.43  0.12 0.29 0.52  0.00 0.80 4.90  0.17 0.61 1.25
 0.95 0.97 0.99  0.46 0.55 0.64  0.00 0.13 0.45  0.00 0.15 0.28
 0.11 0.16 0.22  0.00 0.04 0.13  0.14 0.27 0.40  0.06 0.19 0.31
 18.73 63.66 100.00  0.39 0.50 0.63  99.99 58.56 14.45  29.20 10.02 6.03
 25.51 67.47 99.99  27.06 72.43 100.00
E3
 4.20 4.46 4.83  0.32 0.58 0.92  0.00 0.10 1.18  0.18 0.54 1.01
 0.97 0.99 1.00  0.48 0.54 0.60  0.18 0.45 1.31  0.00 0.12 0.26
 0.29 0.33 0.38  0.04 0.17 0.30  0.20 0.34 0.43  0.24 0.34 0.44
 5.58 37.52 84.41  0.24 0.30 0.36  99.15 78.31 31.55  29.43 8.86 7.90
 1.57 24.00 54.74  25.50 72.28 100.00
E4
 4.21 5.34 8.29  0.71 0.84 1.21  0.03 3.09 8.66  1.58 2.18 2.83
 0.90 0.96 0.99  0.57 0.74 0.94  0.09 0.24 0.66  0.23 0.29 0.36
 0.00 0.02 0.08  0.00 0.05 0.13  0.00 0.14 0.31  0.00 0.08 0.18
 0.70 4.10 8.88  0.77 0.89 0.98  19.05 7.26 3.18  62.00 38.11 3.38
 36.63 76.87 100.00  9.71 62.25 99.99
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TABLE 6. The tradeoff model with a cumulative weighing of time and anomalies to the Net Present
Value model reported in the literature.
Designation
Comparison
Effect
Accommodated
by Equations
(3a) and (3b)?Control Experimental
Hidden-zero effect
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
SS0: (xS, tS; 0, tL)
LL0: (0, tS; xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
Asymmetric hidden-
zero effect
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
Sooner
zero
SS: (xS, tS)
LL0: (0, tS; xL, tL)
No
effect
Yes
Later
zero
SS0: (xS, tS; 0, tL)
LL: (xL, tL)
More
patience
Front-end amount
effect
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
SSF: (xF + xS, tS)
LLF: (xF, tS; xL, tL)
Less
patience
No
Reverse front-end
amount effect
SSA: (xA + xS, tS)
LLA: (xA + xL, tL)
SSFA: (xF + xA + xS, tS)
LLFA: (xF, tS; xA + xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
Relocation effect
SSF: (xR + xS, tS)
LLF: (xR, tS; xL, tL)
SSB: (xS, tS; xR, tL)
LLB: (xR + xL, tL)
Less
patience
Yes
Common-
consequence effecta
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
SSC: (xS, tS; xC, tC)
LLC: (xC, tC; xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
Mere-token effecta
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
SSM: (xM, tM; xS, tS)
LLM: (xM, tM; xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
Amplification
effecta
SSM: (xM, tM; xS, tS)
LLM: (xM, tM; xL, tL)
SSAM: (xA + xM, tM; xS, tS)
LLAM: (xA + xM, tM; xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
Violations of
dominance
SS: (xS, tS)
LL: (xL, tL)
SSD: (xS, tS; xD, tD)
LLD: (xL, tL)
More
patience
Yes
aViolations of independence (Koopmans, 1960).
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TABLE A1. Distribution (row-wise percentages) of those lending support to the four candidate models in the main contest across the five candidate
models in the parallel contest, in Experiments 2, 3, and 4.
Main
contest
Parallel contest
Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ RM n TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ RM n TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ RM n
TM
212 0 0 0 100 312 334 0 0 1 163 498 64 0 0 0 27 91
66% 0% 0% 0% 32% 67% 0% 0% 0% 33% 70% 0% 0% 0% 30%
DIUM
0 62 0 0 18 80 0 102 0 3 32 137 0 61 0 1 19 81
0% 77.5% 0% 0% 22.5% 0% 74.5% 0% 2% 23.5% 0% 75% 0% 1% 24%
SMNZ
2 0 22 0 56 80 1 0 40 0 101 142 0 0 13 0 10 23
2.5% 0% 27.5% 0% 70% 1% 0% 28% 0% 71% 0% 0% 56.5% 0% 43.5%
SMZ
1 0 0 37 10 48 2 1 0 56 12 71 0 2 2 31 6 41
2% 0% 0% 77% 21% 3% 1% 0% 79% 17% 0% 5% 5% 75.5% 14.5%
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TABLE A2. Proportions of Bayesian p-values lower than .05 among those lending anecdotal support to the respective models
in the parallel contest.
Experiment
Model
Adjustment for dominance detection No adjustment for dominance detection
TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ RM TM DIUM SMNZ SMZ RM
2 0% 16.67% 7.14% 0% 0% 0% 9.09% 14.29% 3.70% 100%
3 0% 15.09% 3.85% 0% 0% 0% 11.76% 7.14% 9.68% 100%
4 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9.09% 4.00% 100%
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Screen shot from choice pair #11.
Figure 2. Proportions of participants (above bars) lending increasingly stronger support for
candidate models in Experiment 2 (top panel), Experiment 3 (center panel), and Experiment 4
(bottom panel).
Figure 3. Observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
lending anecdotal support to the respective models (horizontal), plotted against the average
predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models (vertical), in
Experiment 2.
Figure 3. Observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
lending anecdotal support to the respective models (horizontal), plotted against the average
predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models (vertical), in
Experiment 3.
Figure 5. The effect of zero outcomes among those providing anecdotal support for the candidate
models (top panel), and among those providing increasingly stronger support for the Tradeoff
Model (bottom panel), in Experiment 3.
Figure 6. Observed proportions of participants choosing the high NPV option among those
lending anecdotal support to the respective models (horizontal), plotted against the average
predicted probabilities of choosing the high NPV option generated by the models (vertical), in
Experiment 4.
Figure 7. Duration of SS and LL as a function of token magnitude. Duration is given in days, and
computed with u(x) = x, where  = 1 (solid line), .75 (dashed line), and .50 (dotted line). Numbers
along the ordinate are the duration under linear utility for the $50, $500, and $5,000 tokens. The
tokens, along the abscissa, are logarithmically spaced.
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Figure A1. Posterior probabilities for the parallel model contest, averaged across participants, in
Experiment 2 (top panel), Experiment 3 (center panel), and Experiment 4 (bottom panel).
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FIG. 4
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FIG. 5
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FIG. 6
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FIG. A1
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Footnotes
1The MTurk survey included several sections on intertemporal choice and risky choice, but the
choice between the low and high NPV options was always the first section. The sample was 52%
female, with an average age of 34. A majority (58%) were employed (46% full time), and 23%
were student. A majority (62%) had an academic degree (47% bachelors, 13% masters, 2% PhD).
The second survey included several sections on intertemporal choice, and the choice between the
low and high NPV options was always the fourth section. The sample was 57% female, with an
average of 52. A majority (54%) were employed (40% full time), and 3% were student. This
sample was not as well educated as the first, with 42% having concluded high school, and 37%
having concluded university (27% bachelors, 8% masters, 2% PhD).
2When outcomes are distributed over three contiguous time periods and outcome sequences afford
the same total amount of money, as in our experiments, distaste for improvement in the sequences
model is analogous to discounting in the discounted instantaneous utility model. To see the
analogy, compare the sequences {x1, x2, x3} and {y1, y2, y3}, both summing to c. In terms of
monetary values, the difference between weighted improvement scores is (x3 – x1) – (y3 – y1).
At the same time, the difference between Net Present Values is (x1 +  2(c – x1 – x3) +  3x3) –
(y1 +  2(c – y1 – y3) +  3y3), or (( –  2)x1 – ( 2 –  3)x3) – (( –  2)y1 – ( 2 –  3)y3), which,
given distaste for improvement, i.e.,  < 0, is analogous to the difference between weighted
improvement scores, but with discounting giving a greater weight to period 1 than to period 3.
3In Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1993) statement of the model, the spreading scores are weighted
+. We reversed this to , so that the sign of  indicates whether an individual has a positive (
> 0) or negative ( < 0) attitude toward spreading.
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4Duration is also known in the world of finance, where D is the duration of a bond (Macaulay,
1938). In the Macaulay duration, aj is given as:
i
j
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i
t
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rx
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1
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



.
In comparison with the preceding calculation of duration, the outcomes are replaced by the Net
Present Values of the outcomes. Thus, when discounting the future (r > 0), an outcome loses
impact with its distance from the present; if it does not, in the absence of discounting (r = 0), we
obtain the weighted average again.
5A widely discussed topic in the literature on intertemporal choice is whether discounting is
“exponential,” as in the discounted instantaneous utility model, or “hyperbolic.” The discount
function of the discounted instantaneous utility model can be given as tt etd  )( , where  >
0 is constant discounting. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) generalized this into  /)1()(  ttd ,
where  > 0 is discounting, and  > 0 is the departure from constant discounting. Rearranging the
terms in Equation (3b), and reducing each outcome sequence to a single dated outcome (x, t), the
(arithmetically) “discounted utility” of each outcome would be )()( twxu  , where  > 0 is
“discounting.” When the time-weighing function is given as )1log()/1()( ttw   , where  > 0
is diminishing sensitivity to delays (Scholten & Read, 2010), Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992)
generalized hyperbolic discount function follows from exponential discounting over weighted
delays, i.e., )()( twetd  , meaning that hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to diminishing
sensitivity to delays (see also Scholten & Read, 2006). In our investigation, sequences span three
future and contiguous time periods (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), so that any diminishing sensitivity to delays
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is difficult to identify. We therefore let w be the identity function (i.e.,   0), which also ensures
formal equivalence to the discounted instantaneous utility model.
6We used a power value function, because it is widely used in formal modeling, and because it is
versatile in allowing for both diminishing sensitivity ( < 1) and augmenting sensitivity ( > 1) to
outcomes. The tradeoff model, however, was originally proposed to have a logarithmic value
function, analogous to the time-weighing function in Footnote 5, i.e., )1log()/1()( xxv   ,
where  > 0 is diminishing sensitivity to outcomes (Scholten & Read, 2010). Because our results
strongly argue in favor of diminishing sensitivity, the logarithmic value function may be revisited
in future modeling.
7We ran two additional analyses. One used uniform priors from 0 to 1 for , , and  , the density
function 1/(x + 1)2 for the priors on  and ε, which were restricted to positive values, and the
density function 0.5/(|x| + 1)2 for the priors on  and , which can take on negative as well as
positive values. Another analysis used the same priors as in the main contest, except that  was
uniform from 0 to 1 rather than 0 to 5. These analyses yielded the same headline result as the main
contest, which is that TM comes out as the winning model.
8Plots of posteriors of model parameters in the individual-level and group-level analyses are
available as supplemental material at: [ADDRESS].
9For more discussion of similarity effects in intertemporal choice, see Leland (2002), Rubinstein
(2003), Scholten and Read (2010), and Stevens (2016).
10In a choice-based matching study by Scholten, Read, and Sanborn (2014), participants
demanded on average an interest rate of 6.7% per month, so one might expect that the typical
participant will regard an interest rate of 1.9% to be low.
